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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ALICE M. DONAHUE, BARBARA 
D 0 N A HUE, and CONSTANCE 
MARILYN DONAHUE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES 
DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION, 
INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., ARCH E. OVERMAN and C. 
E. OVERMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
7965 
BRIEF OF~RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of facts set forth in the .plaintiffs'* 
brief is substantially correct so far as it goes. It is, how-
ever, incomplete. It omits mention of certain procedural 
steps which shed much light on the case and glosses over 
*Throughout this brief, appellants are referred to as plaintiffs 
and respondents are referred to as defendants, as in the trial court. 
\ 
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most of the testimonial evidence. For this reason and be-
cause of the importance of the case, it is deemed necessary 
to make a more· detailed statement than is contained in 
plaintiffs' brief. 
Procedural History 
The original complaint in this case was filed in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County on November 30, 1949 
(R. 1-5). It alleged that the motion picture "Look for the 
Silver Lining" depicted "the career and used the name of 
Jack Donahue * * * without the permission * * * 
of plaintiffs"; that "the said portrayal * * * [was] 
in part true to life and in many parts wholly untrue," and 
that as· a result of the exhibition of the film by defendants 
"throughout the State of Utah and throughout the United 
States," the plaintiffs as the "heirs" of Jack Donahue had 
been "vexed and annoyed and humiliated and caused great 
mental and physical suffering" to their damage in the sum 
of $350,000.00. The complaint further asked for an in-
junction to prevent future showings of the motion picture 
(R. 1-5). All of the defendants named in the original com-
plaint were served· with process, except .Warner Brothers 
Pictures, Inc., which later was dismissed out of the case on 
motion of the plaintiffs (R. 91). After filing of the com-
plaint, on petition of the defendants the case was removed 
to the United States Districit Court for the District of Utah 
(R. 10-22). The propriety of the removal was not challeng-
ed by the plaintiffs. Instead, after a motion by the defend-
ants for a more definite statement had been granted (R. 
52-54), the plaintiffs filed in the federal court an amended 
complaint (R. 47-54). 
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The amended complaint was similar to the original 
complaint, except that it set forth in greater detail the 
particulars in which the portrayal of Jack Donahue was 
allegedly inaccurate (R. 49). The amended· complaint like 
the original complaint claimed injury to the plaintiffs' feel-
ings in that the exhibition of the film had "vexed and an-
noyed and humiliated" them to their damage. An injunc-
tion again was asked (R. 50-51). The amended complaint 
also contained in paragraph 9 thereof, allegations, that the 
plaintiff, Alice M. Donahue, had collaborated in WTiting a · 
manuscript portraying the true life and career of .Jack 
Donahue which she had been prevented from selling by 
reason of the p_rior exhibition of "Look for the Silver 
Lining." There was no recital of injury or damage by 
reason of these "property" allegations. The federal court 
granted the defendants' motion . to strike paragraph 9 on 
the ground it was immaterial and irrelevant to any purport-
ed cause of action based on an alleged violation of the Utah 
right of privacy statute (R. 46). The defendants thereafter 
filed separate answers to the amended complaint (R. 38-
45). Interrogatories were propounded by both sides (R. 
29-32; 36-37) and answered (R. 33-35; 78-86), and the de-
position of ~rs. Donahue was taken (R. 64-65). The de-
fendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which 
was heard and granted by the federal court on September 
29, 1950 (R. 26). 
The basis of the ruling of the fe9.eral court in granting 
summary judgment was that: (a) The Utah right of 
privacy statute, Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah 
Code Anno. (1943), was invalid under state and federal con-
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stitutional guarantees of free speech and the press if con-
strued as claimed by the plaintiffs. (b) The aforesaid statu-
tory prohibition against the use of a name, portrait or pic-
ture of a deceased person for "advertising purposes or for 
purposes of trade" was not applicable to the exhibition of 
motion pictures. (c) Under the Utah conflict of laws rule 
in tort cases, the substantive rights of the plaintiffs must 
be determined by the law of the place of injury, which in 
this instance was California where the plaintiffs at all times 
resided and were physically present, and under the law of 
California the plaintiffs were without remedy. In light of 
the foregoing, the federal court held that on the basis of the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, 
no genuine issue existed as to any material fact. According-
ly, summary judgment in favor of each of the defendants 
was entered (R. 26). From this judgment, the plaintiffs 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth 
Circuit. 
The case was argued before the Tenth Circuit on three 
separate occasions. The first hearing was held before three 
judges of that Court. About a month later, a reargument 
was ordered before the full court of five judges. Several 
weeks later an opinion was handed down affirming the 
lower court's judgment by a three to two vote of the judges. 
Upon plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the case was set 
down for reargument a third time, and in its final opinion 
the Court reversed its previous position and entered a three 
to two decision in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 24-25). The 
final majority opinion and the dissenting opinion by Chief 
Judge Phillips are reported at 194 F. (2d) 6; 15. In sub-
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stance, the majority opinion holds that: (a) The constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and press are applicable 
only to publications which are essentially educational or 
informative or purely biographical, and unless the motion 
picture involved in this case comes within one of these 
categories, it would be inhibited by the Utah statute. (b) 
Motion pictures or other publications "based primarily 
upon fiction or the imagination and designed primarily to 
entertain and amuse an audience desiring entertainment 
and willing to pay therefor" constitute· "trade" within the 
meaning of that term in the Utah statute, and if "Look for 
the Silver Lining" were a publication of that type it would 
be prohibited by the Utah statute, as distinguished from a 
publication of the type protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. (c) On the basis of the allegations of 
the plaintiffs' amended complaint, it could not be determined 
as a matter .of law whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was 
within the protection of free speech and the press as de-
fined and limited by the Court or whether it was pro-
scribed by the statutory prohibition against "trade" as 
defined by the Court; therefore, it was decided that· the 
case should be returned to the lower court for further pro-
ceedings. The majority opinion seemingly ignored the con-
flict of laws argument urged by the defendants. With refer-
ence to the ruling of the lower court in striking the "prop-
erty" allegations of paragraph 9, the Court said that such 
action was not error, since the allegations did not bear any 
relevancy or materiality to any cause of action basea on 
the Utah right of privacy statute. 
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After the Tenth Circuit had returned the case to the 
lower federal court, the plaintiffs made a motion to remand 
the cause to the state court from which it originally had 
been removed, on the ground that removal had been im-
provident · (R. 23). Defendants consented to the motion. 
The federal court so ordered (R. 61). After remand, the 
parties filed a stipulation and order signed by one of the 
state court judges on June 14, 1952, ·in which it was pro-
vided that the pleadings and papers which theretbfore had 
been filed in the federal court should be treated as if they 
had been filed originally in the .state· court (R. 63-65). The 
same stipulation and order provided that the action of the 
federal court in striking the "property" allegations of 
paragraph 9 should be adopted as the ruling of the state 
court (R. 64). 
Certain preliminary motions and arguments then were 
heard and disposed of by the state court, including a denial 
by the trial judge on August 13, 1952, of a motion by plain-
tiffs to further amend the amended complaint by adding 
certain allegations pertaining to additional "property" 
claims of plaintiffs (R. 67; 69) . Defendants, without ob-
jection, were granted leave to file amendments to their 
answers setting forth counterclaims for a declaratory judg-
ment (R .. 93). These counterclaims requested a declara-
tory judgment with respect to the defendants' right to 
exhibit and re-~xhibit in Utah "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" also other and similar type motion pictures portraying 
deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue either factual-
ly or fictionally (R. 94-109). Plaintiffs filed a reply ad-
mitting substantially all of the allegations for declaratory 
relief (R·. 110-111). 
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The case proceeded to trial in the state court on No.-
vember 17, 1952. Testimony was heard for five days (R. 
112-166), also the motion picture "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" was·exhibited to the jury and trial court (R. 363-368). 
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both sides had 
rested, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, advanc-
ing substantially the same contentions with respect to the 
construction of the Utah statute and the applicable conflict 
of laws rule as they had urged throughout the case.· The 
trial judge took the motion under advisement (R. 115) 
and submitted the issues to the jury (R. 116). With re-. 
spect to the construction of the Utah statute, the jury was 
instructed (R. 151-171; 544-558) in accordance with the 
views expressed in the majority opinion of the Tenth Cir-
cuit. The jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action" 
in favor of the defendants (R. 172). On December 16, 
1952, the trial court overruled the plaintiffs' motion for a 
new trial, and granted the defendants' request. for declara-
tory relief as prayed in their counterclaims (R. 175). In 
the declaratory judgment (R. 179-181), the trial court 
adopted views of the law contrary to the majority of the 
Tenth Circuit, but consistent with the minority opinion of 
Chief Judge Phillips. 
Testimony at the Trial 
The only witnesses called by the plaintiffs during the 
trial were Mrs. Alice M. Donahue, the widow of Jack Dona-
hue, and her two daughters, Barbara and Constance Mari-
lyn. The two daughters were only seven and five years of 
age, respectively, when their father died (R. 337; 354). 
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Their brief testimony (R. 337-361) added nothing of signifi-
cance to that of Mrs. Donahue's. 
Mrs. Alice M. Ponahue testified as follows: 
She was the widow of Jack Donahue (R. 206). She 
and her daughters were residents of Los Angeles, California, 
and had regarded California as their home since 1936. 
Prior thereto they had resided in New York and Mass-
achusetts (R. 214; 254). Until the time of the trial, they 
had never been in Utah except to stay overnight at a motor 
court on the way to their summer home at Cape Cod (R. 
253). 
Jack Donahue, whose real name was John James Don-
ahue (R. 274), was born in Charlestown, Massachusetts 
(R. 284). His father's name was Dennis; his mother's 
name was Julia. He had a brother Joe and another brother 
Walter. His sisters- were Margy and Alice (R. 274). Mrs. 
Donahue first met Jack Donahue in 1910, when she was only 
fourteen years of age (R. 275). Jack was then seventeen or 
eighteen years of age (R. 275). Prior to their meeting, 
Jack Donahue had done some dancing in vaudeville theatres 
on amateur nights, but he had done no professional danc-
ing (R. 207; 275). She had done amateur ballet dancing, 
but had had no professional engagements (R. 207). Alice's 
mother advertised in the Boston Globe for a dancing part-
ner for Alice and Jack answered the ad. Thereafter they be-
came a dancing team. During their first few engagements 
they danced under the name of "Scott and Duprey" ( R. 
207). Later they used their own names of "Donahue and 
Stewart" or "Stewart and Donahue" (R. 208). As indi-
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cated by the scrapbooks, Exhibits 1-8 incl., they toured 
the country as a dancing and comedy team from 1910 to 
1920, and intermittently from 1920 to 1925 ( R. 208 ; 250-
251). Alice and Jack were married April 6, 1911, the year 
following their first meeting (R. 208). They had three 
children. Alma, the first child, was born in 1920 (R. 209). 
Barbara was born in 1922. Constance Marilyn was born 
in 1925 (R. 213). Since filing of the present lawsuit, Alma 
had died (R. 194). 
Jack Donahue first played in a Broadway show in 
"Kitchy-Koo" in 1918-1919. He next had a part in "Angel 
Face" and in the "Ziegfeld Follies" of 1920 and 1921 (R. 
218). In 1921-1922 he played in "Two Little Girls in 
Blue" and starred in a dancing and comedy part in "Molly 
Darling" (R. 219). He appeared in "Be Yourself" in 1924-
1925. In ·1925-1927, he co-starred with Marilyn Miller in 
"Sunny" at the New Amsterdam Theatre (R. 220). He next 
starred with Marilyn . Miller in "Rosalie" (R. 221). In 
both "Sunny" and "Rosalie" Jack Donahue played a dancing 
and comedy part (R. 246). Jack Donahue was co-author 
with Fred Thompson of the show "Sons 0' Guns." He 
wrote his own scenes and starred in the show during the 
season of 1929-1930 (R. 222). Jack Donahue died October 
1, 1930, at the age of 38 years (R. 223) . At the time of his 
death he was regarded as one of the top dancing-comedian 
entertainers of his day ( R. 243) . 
Mrs. Donahue and her daughters saw the motion pic-
ture "Look for the Silver Lining" at a preview showing at 
Beverly Hills Theatre in Los Angeles on March 15, 1949 
(R. 244; 251). They saw the motion picture only on that 
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one occasion (R. 225) . They regarded it as an attempted 
portrayal of the life and character of Jack Donahue (R. 
334). It was produced and exhibited without their consent 
(R.: 95). 
"Look for the Silver Lining" is principally the story 
of Marilyn Miller. Jack Donahue is really a secondary 
character (R. ~16). The motion picture shows Marilyn 
Miller dancing as a child in an act called the "Five Colum-
bians" (R. 231; 317). Later she becomes a star on Broad-
way and appears in such well-known productions as "Sally" 
and· "Sunny." Scenes from these productions are repro-
duced in "Look for the Silver Lining" (R. 317). The part 
of Marilyn Miller is played by June Haver and the part of 
Jack Donahue by Ray Bolger (R. 226) . According to Mrs. 
Donahue, the motion picture is untrue in its portrayal of 
Jack Donahue, except that Marilyn Miller and Jack Don-
ahue did star together in "Sunny" and "Rosalie" and Jack 
I 
Donahue was a dancer (R. 228). 
In Mrs. Donahue's opinion, Jack Donahue is shown 
in the picture as brash, forward and self-confident, where-
as in fact he was shy and diffident (R. 229-230). The 
motion picture shows Jack Donahue meeting Marilyn Mil-
ler in 1913 or 1914, when she was a young girl with the 
"Five Columbians." In fact, Jack Donahue and Marilyn 
Miller didn't meet until they started rehearsing for "Sunny" 
in 1925 (R. 232). The motion picture shows Jack Donahue 
and Marilyn Miller dancing on the stage of a night club in 
London in 1913 or 1914. Also in the same sequence, Jack 
Donahue is shown exhibiting a picture of his baby daughter 
to Marilyn Miller. According to Mrs. Donahue, Jack Don-
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ahue never danced at a night club in London (R. 230) and 
at that time he had no children (R. 231). Jack Donahue did 
go to London in 1923 and spent four weeks there. Mrs. Don-
ahue did not go with him (R. 329), and therefore she could 
not say from her personal knowledge whether or not he 
went to a night club ( R. 329) . 
Another thing Mrs. Donahue objected to in the motion . 
picture was that it indicated a great friendliness between 
Jack Donahue and Marilyn Miller. In real life, however, 
the friendliness was of such a nature that the Donahue's 
youngest daughter was christened Constance Marilyn, after 
Miss Miller (R. 314). As a publicity stunt Marilyn Miller 
acted as godmother at the christening (R. 314). They all 
went to a church and posed for newspaper J>ictures. A 
newspaper photograph of the event is contained in one of 
the scrapbooks, Exhibit 3. But it was just a publicity 
stunt and more fictionalization. A proper christening cere-
mony was performed later (R. 315). The motion picture 
makes hardly any reference to Jack Donahue's home life 
(R. 335). It does indicate that at one point in her career, 
Marilyn Miller had a romantic attachment for Jack· Don-
ahue. But then Jack Donahue in the kindest way tells her 
that he is happily married, that.he thought everybody knew 
it, and he shows Marilyn a picture of his baby girl and in-
vites her to come and see his family (R. 335). Mrs. Don-
ahue admitted that this scene constituted the only reference 
in the motion pictur~ to Jack Donahue's home lifE} (R. 
335) and there was nothing in that scene which unfavor-
ably reflected on it (R. 336). 
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Mrs. Donahue agreed that in real life Jack Donahue 
was a merry and happy person. He would give encourage-
ment to another young artist (R. 318). He frequently was 
referred to as "The Man with the Laughing Feet" (R. 
319), and as one of the foremost dancers and comedians of 
his time (R. 319). In real life, Jack Donahue was a 
friendly, sincere, and understanding person ( R. 320) . He 
was devoted to the stage and to his art, and spent his whole 
life trying to become a success (R. 321). In real life, Jack 
Donahue was a very charming man (R. 321). One of his 
great qualities was his kindness (R. 321). He had the abil-
ity to captivate audiences and project a glow of warmth 
across the footlights (R. 321-322). He had a capacity for 
friendship and loyalty (R. 322). He also was a person of 
imagination and was good at improvisations (R. 323). 
He earnestly applied himself to his work in the "show 
must go on" tradition (R. 324). Mrs. Donahue conceded the 
foregoing qualities of personality were important (R. 324). 
She wouldn't agree, however, that these qualities of person-
ality would be the really important things in· any portrayal 
of Jack Donahue (R. 324-325). Furthermore, she did not 
think that "Look for the Silver Lining" portrayed Jack 
Donahue as possessing any of these characteristics (R. 
320...324). 
Before Mrs. Donahue ever had seen "Look for the Sil-
ver ·Lining" she consulted with her attorney, Mr. Louis 
Blau of Los Angeles (R. 252). Mr. Blau was an associate 
of Mr. Chester Smith, who was in the courtroom assisting 
Mr. Arnold Rich in the trial of the case (R. 251). Mr. 
Blau thought it would be a good idea if she and her daugh· 
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ters went to see the motion picture, so they did ( R. 252) . 
They were terribly upset ( R. 324), humiliated and dis-
tressed by the movie (R. 235; 255). In leaving the theatre, 
they felt like little dogs running out. The thing that seemed 
so terrible was the way they were ignored (R. 235). No 
one spoke to them in the lobby except a man connected with 
Warner Bros. by the name of B. S. DeSylva (R. 235). Un-
til she saw the motion picture at the Beverly Hills Theatre 
on March 15, 1949, her feelings had not been hurt by the 
portrayal of Jack Donahue (R. 257; 259). It was when 
she saw the picture that her feelings were hurt (R. 257-
258). Neither Mrs. Donahue nor her daughters ever had 
seen "Look for the Silver Lining" in Utah (R. 225) . She 
first learned it had been exhibited in Utah from Mr. Pres-
ton D. Richards, another one of her attorneys. Mr. Rich-
ards came to see her at her home in Los Angeles (R. 247). 
So far as the hurt to her feelings were concerned, she never 
had picked out any particular states in which to measure 
her hurt, except California and Utah. She didn't know why 
she had picked out Utah (R. 258). She had no knowledge 
of any particular exhibition of the motion picture in Utah 
by any of the defendants named. She just knew in a gen-
eral way that the picture had been exhibited in Utah (R. 
273). Mrs. Donahue didn't think that she could limit the 
hurt to her . feelings to the boundaries of any particular 
state (R. 262). The damages asked in her amended com-
plaint were based upon the hurt she felt as a result of the 
exhibition of the motion picture throughout the United 
States and throughout the world (R. 262; 265-266) . The 
prayer for damages referred to all exhibitions of the mo-
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tion picture, including the exhibition at the Beverly Hills 
Theatre in Los Angeles which she and her daughters had 
witnessed (R. 265). It was upon seeing the picture in Cali-
fornia that she felt the most acute shock to her feelings 
(R. 265). 
Mrs. Donahue and Jack Donahue wrote a book en-
titled Letters of a Hoofer to His Ma. They collaborated, 
even though Jack Donahue's name was used as author (R. 
215). The chapters that made up the book were serialized 
in the Cosmopolitan Magazine during Jack Donahue's life-
time. After his death, Mrs. Donahue put the material to-
gether in book form and arranged for its publication (R. 
215; 276). The book concern~ a dancer and comedian 
named Jack Donahue, who does eccentric dancing (R. 277). 
In the book, as in fact, Jack Donahue has a father by the 
name of Dennis (R. 277), brothers by the name of Walter 
and Joe, and a mother named Julia · ( R. 278) . Also, as in 
real life, the Jack Donahue portrayed in the book came 
from Charlestown, Massachussetts, and the names of places 
where he performed were the actual places where Jack 
Donahue did perform (R. 278). At the beginning of each 
chapter or letter in the book is a date and a program. These 
dates and programs were taken from the actual programs 
used at the places where Jack and Mrs. Donahue appeared 
(R. 280). However, the incidents. contained in Letters of 
a Hoofer to His Ma are fictional (R. 277). For example, 
the reference in the book to how Jack Donahue's father 
liked his whiskey are fictional (R. 278). The same is true 
of the episodes in which Jack Donahue becomes romantical-
ly involved with girls possessing foreign accents (R. 279). 
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The book also refers to an incident at the old Howard 
Theatre, a burlesque house in Boston, involving Jack Don-
ahue's father, his brother Joe, and certain gag lines con-
cerning the "smallness" of his father (R. 281-282). This 
did not actually occur ( R. 283) , even though the same· 
monologue was used by Jack Donahue in some of his stage 
performances (R. 290). As in the book,. Jack Donahue 
often fictionalized himself and his life (R. 327) . He fre-, 
quently ridiculed himself in order to get laughs· ( R. 328) . 
During his lifetime, Jack Donahue wrote for the Satur-
day Evening Post (R. 215), including an article entitled 
"Ad Libbing" which appeared in the issue of October 5, 
1929, and an article entitled "Hoofing'' published on Sep-
tember 14, 1929 (R. 285) . Mrs. Donahue collected data 
and did the research work for these articles (R. 215; 
285) . The articles purport to refer to the personal history 
of Jack Donahue and his dancing career. Some of the in-
cidents related therein are true and some are untrue (R. 
285). Articles of this sort were used for publicity pur-
poses (R. 286; 288). In the article "Ad Libbing" it is not 
true as stated therein that Jack. Donahue ran away from 
home at an early age, that he joined Dr. Zurega's traveling 
medicine show, that he toured the country with the medicine 
show doing dance routines and eventually was brought 
home by a truant officer (R. 286-287) .. Neither is it ·true 
as reported in the article that Jack Donahue played with 
a stock company at Muff, Utah, or that he toured the coun-
try doing solo dancing ( R. 289) . It is true as stated in the 
article that Jack Donahue's father worked in the Navy 
Yard at Charlestown (R. 290), and that his father opposed 
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his son's stage ambitions (R. 288). It is true also that Jack 
Donahue did perform a monologue in which he made un-
complimentary jokes about his father (R. 290-291). Also 
the portion of the article telling about the Broadway shows 
in which Jack Donahue appeared is true (R. 295). Even 
though the article purports to be actual experiences of 
Jack Donahue, it is largely fictional. Jack Donahue was 
just trying to be funny (R. 289). The same situation exists 
in connection with the episodes related in the article "Hoof-
ing" (R. 293-295). 
In 1943, Mrs. Donahue and a Miss Pulsifer collaborated 
in writing a biographical synopsis of Jack Donahue's life. 
The synopsis, finished in 1944, purported to portray Jack 
Donahue's life and career (R. 301). The manuscript as 
originally written was registered and the incidents con-
tained therein concerning Jack Donahue's life were accur-
ately set forth (R. 301; 304). However, after the present 
suit had been filed and Mrs. Donahue's deposition had been 
taken in February, 1950, the manuscript was rewritten and 
revised (R. 305). The first twenty-three or twenty-four 
pages of the revised manuscript are fictional and were 
added for the purpose of creating interest in Jack Donahue's 
life (R. 301-302; 305; 327). This was done because they 
could not get any interest in the registered version (R. 305) · 
The fictional material added by Mrs. Donahue and Miss 
Pulsifer was taken in part from the Saturday Evening Post 
articles (R. 301). The revised synopsis was prepared with 
the idea that it eventually might be made into a screen play 
(R. 326). Through her agent, Mrs. Donahue attempted to 
interest various motion picture companies in the revised 
version of the manuscript (R. 306) . Her agent submitted 
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it to various motion picture companies ( R. 302) . The man-
uscript was admitted in evidence at the tri~l as Exhibit 12 
(R. 190). 
Mrs. Donahue conceded that in the manuscript she 
had written, in the articles which Jack Donahue himself 
wrote, and in the interviews which Jack Donahue gave out 
to newspaper reporters and writers, his life and career were 
continuously fictionalized (R. 308; 314). He frequently 
represented that he had done single vaudeville around the 
country during his early career, which was not true (R. 
325). He frequently represented himself as having danced 
in burlesque, which was not true (R. 328). In the scrap-
books, Exhibits 1-8, and in various newspaper articles many 
references are made to experiences in Jack Donahue's life, 
which are _purely fictional. This continued even after his 
death. For example, the New York Times of October 2, 
1930, carried an article announcing Jack Donahue's death 
(R. 306). The obituary refers to· Donahue's part in a 
traveling medicine show, his participation in specialty 
numbers between acts of plays by the young Adams Re-
pertoire Troupe in Chicago, and to his acting in burlesque 
stock before moving into vaudeville. This was all untrue 
(R. 307-308) . 
According to Mrs. Donahue, show business is the great 
world of make-believe (R. 333). It is common among pub-
lic entertainers for them to fictionalize episodes in their 
lives (R. 314). Jack Donahue continuously conformed to 
this pattern. He thought such representations were amus-
ing (R. 309; 314), that they added color, glamor and inter-
est to his career (R. 309). In order to appear funny, both 
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Jack Donahue and Mrs. Donahue assumed all kinds of crazy 
poses and did all sorts of crazy antics and often had their 
pictures taken in these poses. These pictures frequently 
· were published in the newspapers, as indicated by the scrap. 
books (R. 310). Mrs. Donahue, herself, created quite a 
sensation for those days by wearing tight trousers in one 
of their acts (R. 311). There were many unfavorable com-
ments about it. The act was termed "crude" by some 
people (R. 311). The London newspaper in Canada referred 
to her as unnecessarily vulgar and suggestive (R. 311). 
She and Jack Donahue also had a stunt termed a "shirt .. 
. I 
tail gag" (R. 312). But Mrs. Donahue and her husband 
were show people and were used to taking the bad with the 
good. Among the things they were especially concerned 
about was that their . names and act be kept before the 
public and that they should attract public notice. They 
wanted their act and their personalities well-known (R. 
313). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendants 
called as witnesses, Professor Walter Prichard Eaton, Dr. 
Lorin F. Wheelwright, Professor Lilla Belle Pitts, Dr. 
Mark May and Mr. Eric Haight. All of these witnesses 
testified to the educational and informative value of "Look 
for the Silver Lining." The motion picture, itself, also was 
shown to the court and jury (R. 363-368). 
Professor Walter Prichard Eaton testified as follows: 
For many years he was dramatic critic for The New 
York Tribune, The New York Sun, and The American 
Magazine (R. 472). From 1919 to 1922 he was lecturer in 
dramatic criticism at the School of Journalism, Columbia 
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University. He had lectured on the history of the American 
theatre at summer schools from Harvard and Columbia and 
the University of Iowa to the Utah State Agricultural Col-
lege at Logan, Utah. In 1933, he succeeded George Pierce 
Baker as Professor of Playwrighting at Yale .University (R. 
472). Since his retirement at Yale in 1947, he has taught 
courses· in playwriting and American dramatic history at 
the University of Texas, University of North Carolina, and 
Rawlins College, Florida ( R. 4 73). He has written two or 
three collections of dramatic criticisms, also a book entitled 
The Actor's Heritage, another entitled The History .of the 
Theatre Guild for the First Ten Years, and a textbook The 
Drama in England. He also has written quite a number of 
plays for radio and television, including . "Queen Victoria" 
which was produced on Broadway (R. 470). 
When one speaks of playwriting, the m<?__tion pict~re is 
included since the motion picture is really the dramatic 
medium of today. If a motion picture does not have the 
same dramatic structure as a play, it will not succeed· (R. 
474). As a teacher and dramatic critic, he would classify 
"Look for the ·silver Lining" as a biographical play about 
the life and times of Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue 
(R .. 474-475). Of course_, there is no such thing as a bio-
graphical.play in the scientific sense (R. 4 75). No histori-
cal or biographical play ever has been written which did not 
contain some fictional elements. "Anthony and Cleopatra" 
would be classified as a biographical play, though Shake-
speare knew nothing about either of them (R. 492). It is 
doubtful that either Anthony or Cleopatra spoke in blank 
verse in real life (R. 490). If a biographical play has noth-
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ing in it but absolute, accurate facts, practically all dialogue 
would have to be eliminated. You cannot have a play un-
less the characters speak, and that means the writer has 
to make up the conversation. The moment you start to 
write an historical play, you start to write fiction and 
nothing else can be made. out of it (R. 4 75). The goal of 
the dramatist is to make the conversation typical of the 
person involved (R. 475-477). Another problem of the 
playwright. is the necessity to condense. In writing a bio-
graphical play, dramatic episodes covering many years 
have to be com pressed into the length of a play. A play 
must have a beginning and an ending; it has to 
move forward and carry the interest of the audience. To 
accomplish this certain episodes must be compressed and 
others invented. The writer of a biographical play or mo-
tion picture has the constant problem of how much he must 
alter facts and juggle dates in order to make an effective 
story (R. 476-477). 
That parts of the motion picture "Look for the Silver 
Lining" may be fictional would not change its classification 
as a biographical play (R. 478). The only pertinent ques-
tion is ~hether the motion picture contains so much fiction 
that it alters the underlying purpose of the play. The un-
derlying purpose of "Look for the Silver Lining" is to de-
pict an era (R. 478). In this, the motion picture reason-
ably well resolves the dramatic problems which confronted 
its authors (R. 4 79) . The fictionalized parts were neces-
sary. For example, the motion picture shows Marilyn 
Miller joining her family on the stage when she is about 
fifteen years old. In fact, she did so when she was only 
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five years old. The reason for the change is obvious.· No 
adult actress could play a five year old at the beginning of 
the picture and create any illusion. Another change is the 
introduction of Jack Donahue in the motion picture long 
before he actually did meet Marilyn Miller. Why is t~is? 
Because he is the second most important person in the play. 
If he were not introduced until he actually did meet Mari-
lyin Miller when they began rehearsals for "Sunny," more 
than half the motion picture would be over before Jack 
Donahue's appearance. You would say, "Where did this 
........... stranger come from?" So he is brought into the story early, 
in violation of actual chronology, in order that the audience 
may meet him, get to know him, see him dance, and feel 
something of his quality when the play swings toward its 
climax (R. 480). So far as Jack Donahue is concerned, he 
is shown in the motion picture as a real person. The purpose 
of the portrayal is to represent the kind of man that he was. 
Whether he went to London in 1914 or 1923 is utterly un-
important. The important thing is whether the portrayal 
shows the same kind of a person as the real Jack Donahue. 
Was he a kind soul? Did he have twinkling feet? Is he a 
person who mak~s us feel warm and good when we see 
him? These important things the motion picture correctly 
represents (R. 492). 
In Professor Eaton's opinion "Look for the Silver 
Lining" would be of educational value to college students 
(R. 481). It illustrates phases of early vaudeville. It shows 
the development from vaudeville to the musical comedy re-
vue of the 1920's. By seeing "Look for the Silver Lining" 
a student of the American Theatre would get a feeling of 
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what that period was like. It is historically educational to 
see that at the same time F. Scott Fitzgerald's flaming 
youth were swallowing bathtub gin, the delightful and 
wholesome Jack Donahue was captivating the rest of the 
people. If one is studying the American Theatre, "Sally" 
and "Sunny" are not the most important things in it, but 
they are part of the picture. , Marilyn Miller and Jack Don-
ahue were the top performers on the musical comedy stage 
_ of their day. "Look for the Silver Lining" in its portrayal 
of these two outstanding personalities is a kind of antidote 
to a great deal of the books and criticisms of that era (R. 
482). Like Mark Sullivan's history of Our Times or Fred 
Allen's book concerning the First Fifty Years of Life in the 
Nineteenth Century, "Look for the Silver Lining" tells of 
the songs that people of that time were singing and of the 
places and plays people were attending (R. 483). 
The creation and exhibition of a play or motion pic-
ture is not considered a matter of '~trade" by authors, 
critics or anyone familiar with the drama (R. 485). The 
production of a play or motion picture is regarded as an 
artistic accomplishment. The writer or composer is giving 
out to the public his idea or conception of something in life 
(R. 487). When the creation is completed, the artist turns 
to something else. The object o~ trade is something like 
Campbell's soup , that is reproduced over and over again 
(R. 497). For instance, there is a product known as Prince 
Albert Tobacco. Stamped on each can is a picture of Prince 
Albert in his whiskers and long frock coat (R. 488). Clear-
ly, that is the use of a picture of an historical character for 
the purposes of trade and advertising. In contrast, in the 
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play "Victoria Regina" in which Helen Hayes had such an 
enormous success two or three years ago, there were several 
episodes about the same Prince Albert with the same whis-
kers and the same long frock coat. Certainly, the author 
of "Victoria Regina" did not regard himself as engaging in 
trade when he wrote that play (R. 489) . 
When Salt Lake City was only thirteen years old and 
still a tiny hamlet in the desert, the people working and 
toiling together created a perfectly beautiful theatre, the 
old Salt Lake Theatre. It was the finest buildings of its kind 
west of the Rocky Mountains and accoustically the best in 
America. For eight or ten years there were no railroads and 
no traveling stock companies were able to come to Salt Lake, 
so the people organized their own company and gave plays 
and charged admission. Finally, the railroad arrived and 
the traveling stock companies could get to Utah, and then 
Booth and Barrett and all the great actors and actresses of 
America came to Salt Lake. But did anyone believe that 
what went on in that beautiful old theatre was trade? 
(R. 500) . Not at all. The people believed, as Brighp,m 
Young had said, that the dramatic entertainment of a people 
was just as important to their health and happiness as their 
religion (R. 500). A person who makes a play or a motion 
picture and the person who exhibits it and charges admis-
sion therefor is a purveyor of a kind of spiritual food. 
You can't call that "trade" by any common understanding 
of the word (R. 501). 
Professor Eaton recalled having met Jack Donahue 
personally and having seen him perform in several of his 
Broadway successes (R. 484). On the basis of his personal 
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observation, he thought the Jack Donahue portrayed in 
"Look for the Silver Lining" was quite similar to the Jack 
Donahue .of real life. He thought Ray Bolger's dancing 
approximated the charm and twinkle of the real Jack 
Donahue extraordinarily well (R. 484). 
Dr. Lorin F. Wheelwright testified as follows : 
He graduated from the University of Utah with a 
major in music and a minor in educational psychology. 
He received a Ph.D. from Columbia University, where his 
doctor's thesis had to do with the reading of music (R. 
369; 373). Alexander Schreiner and Edward P. Kimball 
trained him as an organist (R. 370). He was the Director 
of the Arts Division of the Utah Centennial Commission and 
Production Manager of the musical play "Promised Val-
ley" (R. 371). From 1936 to 1949, he was Supervisor of 
Music in the Salt Lake City Schools (R .. 371). On behalf 
of the Philosophical Library of New York he wrote a chap-
ter dealing with the use of films in music education in the 
book Films in Education. Since and during his connection 
with the Salt Lake City Schools, he has served as Chairman 
of the Audio Visual Aids Committee which previews mo-
tion pictures for use in the city schools (R. 37 4). 
Dr. Wheelwright has viewed "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" (R. 375) and in his opinion it has definite educational 
values (R. 376). In nearly all schools today, there are ex-
pensive auditoriums built mainly for the purpose of per· 
mitting students to stage operettas and other dramatic pre-
sentations. "Look for the Silver Lining" has a direct bear-
ing upon the required skills and ideals of good showmanship 
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(R. 377). It gives an acquaintance with productions as they 
take place -on Broadway under original settings. Excerpts 
from musical productions such as ''Sally" and "Sunny" 
give the student a chance to better visualize what his job 
is in school productions (R. 400). ''Look for the Silver 
Lining" teaches what hard work show people must go 
through in order to achieve excellence in their profession. 
It emphasizes the necessity for rehearsal (R. 378). It 
portrays the ideal that success is never won alone, but 
must be shared (R. 380) ; that success is a joint responsibil-
ity and a joint reward (R. 381). It adheres to the ideal 
that human affection is something to cherish (R. 381). It 
illustrates that friendship is the result of the sincerity of the 
individual in his interest toward others (R. 381). The 
characterization of Jack Donahue in the film shows a man, 
who though an expert entertainer, is the personification of 
friendship and courtesy (R. 381). Another ideal of human 
affection shown in the film is the marital relationship, 
which is treated on a hfgh class basis (R. 385). It illustrates 
also the necessity for self-confidence, without which one 
fails in the theatrical business as in other aspects of life 
(R. 379). Another teaching is that the audience must be 
pleased (R. 379). The picture shows the necessity of good 
communication from the actors to the audience. Not only 
is there good speech, but clean articulation in the musical 
and dancing rhythms (R. 387). 
One of the basic elements of good showmanship is that 
every drama in order to be interesting must portray con-
flict. Conflict is usually of three kinds : ( 1) Man against 
man. (2) Man against his fate, the thing he cannot control. 
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(3) Man against himself, that which he could become or 
wishes to become. "Look for the Silver Lining" portrays 
all three of these types of conflict (R. 388-389). It is 
beautifully put together and expresses a unity from be-
gining to end. The musical theme helps tie the picture 
together. The characterizations are consistent through. 
out. It gives proper emphasis where needed. The 
film has coherence (R. 390), and by the use of such de. 
vices as "the dissolve" and "the montage," the action of the 
play moves forward and keeps the audience fascinated. 
Furthermore, the action and characterizations are plaus-
ible (R. '391). 
In additionto the elements of good showmanship taught 
by "Lqok for the Silver Lining," it helps to acquaint people 
with an important period of American culture· (R. 399). 
The film shows the historical transition of show business 
from the vaudeville, to the revue, to the light opera (R. 
377). It gives an acquaintance with the musical culture 
of a certain period in American life (R. 400). It acquaints 
people with productions such as "Sally" and "Sunny," 
which are part of the literature of America (R. 404). It 
shows good orchestration when it is well performed. It 
. shows singers singing under certain conditions. It shows 
how a solo performance is worked into an ensemble (R. 
400) .. It gives an acquaintance with historical personalities 
such as Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue (R. 399). 
The film does not lose in educational value because of 
its fictional elements (R. 394). In the art of story telling 
there are broad meanings which are more significant than 
critical details of fact (R. 395). When one is talking about 
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the honesty of Abraham Lincoln, the exact details of the 
various stories about Lincoln which illustrate this quality 
are not important ( R. 396) . So in "Look for the Silver 
Lining'' events covering many years are compressed into 
several short scenes. This is done to convey the essential 
meanings of all the events of the period covered (R. 392). 
So too, in the portrayal of Marilyn Miller and Jack Don-
ahue, certain dramatic license is taken to establish their 
personalities and accentuate their characteristics. It is 
unimportant when Jack Donahue met Marilyn Miller, but 
it is important that when he met her his attitude was one 
of respect and courtesy (R. 382; 397). Fictionalizing in 
drama or motion pictures also is justified in order to create 
greater interest and audience appeal (R. 421). One of the 
fundamental tenents of education is that interest must be 
aroused in the learner in order for him to learn ( R. 423-
424). For a film to have value in the educational field it 
must have audience appeal (R. 423). Whether a film has 
commercial value is beside the point, so far as its education-
al purpose is concerned. Shakespeare wrote many great 
plays that have commercial value and bring in money at the 
box office. Such plays likewise have a very substanthd 
educational value (R. 423). 
The schools of Salt Lake City constantly use and ex-
hibit feature length film such as "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" for educational purposes as part of their curricula. 
Comparable films that have been shown are "A Hundred 
Men and a Girl" starring Deanna Durbin and the Phila-
delphia Symphony Orchestra, also the motion picture "They 
Shall Have Music" featuring the violinist J ascha Heifitz 
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(R. 402). In Dr. Wheelwright's opinion "Look for the 
Silver Lining" is in the same category as these films ( R. 
403). 
Professor Lilla Bell Pitts testified as follows : 
Her business is the teaching of teachers. She is Pro-
fessor of Music Education at Teachers College, Columbia 
University _(R. 431). She has served as Supervisor of 
Music in the schools of Amarillo, Texas, Assistant Super-
visor of Music in the schools of Dallas, Texas, and teacher 
of music in the Junior High Schools of Elizabeth, New 
Jersey (R. 432) .' She has been a visiting Professor of 
Music at various universities throughout the United States, 
including Brigham Young University at Provo, Utah. 
While at B. Y. U. she helped to write a state course of music 
study for the elementary schools of Utah (R. 432). At 
present she is engaged in writing a series of twenty-five 
to thirty music books for use in the schools. The project 
includes books for use from kindergarten through senior 
high school ( R. 433) . The grade school books already have 
been completed and are now in general use in all the schools 
throughout the United States (R. 433). She also has writ-
ten a book on junior high school music called Music Integra-
tion in the Junior High School and a book entitled Music 
Curriculum in the Changing World ( R. 433) . She is past 
president of the National Music Educators' Conference (R. 
434) and a member of the Music Teachers' National Associa-
tion (R. 435). She has written a handbook concerning the 
use of motion picture films in music education (R. 437) 
entitled Sixteen Millimeter Films for Musical Education 
(R. 438). Among other things, the handbook informs 
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teachers where films are available and how they can be 
used. For example, it lists five different places in Utah 
where films can be obtained ( R. 465) . She is Chairman 
of the Music Committee of the National Music Educators' 
Conference which reviews and selects music films for use 
in the schools. In this capacity she saw a screening of 
"Look for the Silver Lining" ( R. 439-440) . 
She is not being paid to testify in this case ( R. 465-
466), but came as a representative of the Music Educators' 
National Conference. This organization is eager to foster 
the use of all available enriching material to carry out its 
major purpose, which is to broaden the base of music ed-
ucation. The influence of motion pictures is so tremendous 
in its reach and the strength of its appeal that she has given 
a great deal of time to doing what she can to disseminate 
information on how films can be used to educational ad-
vantage (R. 466) . If films of the quality of "Look for the 
Silver Lining'' can be made available to the schools, it will 
be a distinct enrichment to the stock of teaching materials 
(R. 466). She has found that motion picture films are 
almost frighteningly influential as a media of education 
(R. 439). 
In the opinion of Miss Pitts, "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" is definitely educational (R. 441). She feels that the 
motion picture has a range comparable to Til Eulenspiegel, 
a story concerning a character of the Middle Ages put to 
music by the late Richard Strauss. The representations and 
legends built around this medieval comedian are comparable 
to the era portrayed in "Look for the Silver Lining" (R. 
447). The film also is in the same category as Wagner's 
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opera The Meistersinger about Hans Sachs. In the days 
of the masters and the guilds, Hans Sachs was a master 
musician who really lived, and he influenced young people 
to write music from the heart rather than from precept 
(R. 447). In like manner "Look for the Silver Lining" 
represents a periQd of development in theatrical musical 
comedy (R. 461). Even though the two outstanding fig-
ures concerned in that development, Marilyn Miller and 
Jack Donahue, rpay not be portrayed with strict accuracy 
from the standpoint of chronology and conjunction of epi-
~odes, they are- truly portrayed as representative of that 
period of cultt1re (R. 462). 
In the opinion of Miss Pitts "Look for the Silver Lin-
ing" is an historical motion picture from the standpoint 
of the era depicted ( R. 446-447) . . There are elements of 
reality in it which are true to the spirit of the times (R. 
44 7) . The fact that the film fictionalizes certain incidents 
in the life of Jack Donahue does not impair its educational 
value (R. 444). Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue were 
outstandingly influential in the period. from 1920 to 1930. 
Their portrayal in the film is symbolical of the era and 
gives color, point and focus to the film. "Look for the Silver 
Lining" also teaches something which it is important for 
people to know, namely, that culture comes from people and 
not from supernatural sources (R. 444). In other respects, 
the film shows the development from the episodic variety 
shQw and vaud~ville, lacking any sort of unity and coher-
ence, to the beginning of something that can be called drama 
with music in the more closely coordinated musical come-
dies of "Sunny" and "Sally" (R. 442). "Look for the Silver 
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Lining" indicates what is occurring and what is likely to 
occur in the future from the standpoint of historical per-. 
spective: That if we ever have real native opera in the 
country, it is likely to have its roots in the popular enter-
tainment field of music rather than in external sources or 
European models ( R. 443) . 
Music is primarily expressed through the human voice 
and the body. It is important for us to recognize that a 
dancer has something to say that is of cultural value. Jack 
Donahue as portrayed in the film, not only has something 
to communicate as a performing artist, but he also uses 
comedy as it has been used since the days of the ancient 
Greeks (R. 444). As a social commentary, it is a salutory 
influence in bringing wit and humor to bear on human 
frailties (R. 445). It helps to remind us that we are all 
amateurs in the business of living (R. 445). 
In 1925, Professor Pitts recalls having seen Jack Dona-
hue perform in "Sunny." In comparing that performance 
with Ray Bolger's dancing in "Look for the Silver Lining" 
she had difficulty realizing she . wasn't seeing the same 
thing she saw in ~925 (R. 448). The spirit and feeling of 
the dancing of both Donahue and Bolger are the same (R. 
463). 
Dr. Mark May testified as follows: 
He is Professor of Educational Psychology at Yale Uni-
versity, a member of the Connecticut State Board of Ed .. 
ucation, and of the American Council on Education. He 
also is Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission 
on Information, which is the citizens' commission which 
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works with the Department of State in respect to the Voice 
of America and other information sent overseas (R. 502). 
For fifteen years he has been Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of Teaching Film Custodians, Inc., a non-profit 
educational corporation of New York (R. 504). 
The purpose of Teaching Film Custodians is to select 
and make available . motion picture films for use for edu-
cational purposes. It utilizes films produced by the motion 
picture companies for the theatre (R. 514). It usually gets 
these films within from one to two years after their na-
tional release (R. 515). The twelve-man Board of Directors 
of Teaching Film Custodians consists of a list of the leading 
educators of the United States (R. 503-506). Selection of 
films is made by committees of teachers appointed by the 
National Educators' Conference. At present there are seven 
such committees, for example, a Committee on English, a 
Committee on Social Studies, and a Committee on Music. 
Professor Lilla Belle Pitts, who previously testified, is the 
Chairman of the Committee on Music. Each of the seven 
committees has the responsibility of selecting films which 
in its judgment have educational value in the teaching of 
the subject which that particular committee represents (R. 
506). Teaching Film Custodians deposits its films in some 
nine hundred educational libraries located throughout the 
United States (R. 508). In Utah, deposits are located at 
the Bureau of Visual Education of the Salt Lake City Pub· 
lie Schools and at the University of Utah (R. 519). The 
films are available to any teacher for a nominal rental. 
Available films include both short subjects and excerpts 
from the so-called feature length films .(R. 507). 
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Dr. 1\'Iay has seen "Look for the Silver Lining" and 
in his opinion the motion picture is definitely of educational 
and informative value (R. 509). This also was the opinion 
of the Music Committee, headed by Professor Pitts, which 
reviewed the film. That Committee expressed a desire for 
the film (R. 517-518), and therefore Teaching Film Cus-
todians requested it from Warner Brothers. That 
Company has confirmed the fact that Teaching Film Cus-
todians may have and use the film. The next step is the 
editing of the film by the Music Committee (R. 512; 517-
518). It is the intent and desire of Teaching Film Cus-
todians that this particular film be distributed along with 
its other educational films as soon as possible (R. 512). 
Mr. Eric Haight testified as follows : 
He is a director of Encyclopedia Britannica Films and 
President of its wholly owned subsidiary, Films, Inc. En-
cyclopedia Britannica Films is the leading producer of 
pedagogical films, sometimes referred to as documentary 
films, in the world (R. 521-522). Films, Inc. is the largest 
distributor of feature length films for use in educational 
purposes (R. 522). For many years the two organizations 
were independent, but they now have joined forces because 
it was felt that the two types of film complement each 
other and make it possible to offer a complete film program 
to American educational institutions (R. 523) . The pri-
mary function of Films, Inc. is the distribution of feature 
films to schools, universities, and other educational groups 
(R. 523-524). Films, Inc. differs fr·om Teaching Film Cus-
todians in that the former uses the entire feature length 
film instead of just excerpts (R. 531). Usually, Films, Inc. 
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gets the feature films within six months of the national re-
lease date (R. 533). 
Representatives of Films, Inc. have reviewed "Look 
for the Silver Lining" (R. 527-528). The film was con-
sidered by them to be suitable for use as an educational film 
and a request has been made for the film (R. 528). If the 
request is granted, Films, Inc., intends to distribute the 
film, without cutting (R. 531), to schools and educational 
institutions throughout the country (R. 535). In Utah, 
Films, Inc. distributes its feature films through the Des-
eret Book Company (R. 525). Much of the business done 
in Utah is with the Wards of the "Mormon" Church and 
therefore all the films deposited with the Deseret Book 
Company are first screened by the L. D. S. Screening Coun-
cil (R. 525). "Look for the Silver Lining" has been screened 
by this Council and unanimously approved (R. 528). 
The gteat interest in feature films in the educational 
field is due primarily to the· fact that motion pictures have 
been found to be the most effective media of communica-
tion in dredging up the basic attitudes held by students. 
The adolescent becomes emotionally involved while witness-
ing a particular film and because of that involvement his 
basic attitudes and feelings are revealed. Frequently these 
attitudes and feelings prove to be a shocking surprise to 
the. curriculum supervisor who has thought the student 
was learning something entirely different ( R. 523) . An-
other reason why the motion picture is such a forceful 
medium of communication is that when you look at it, 
without realizing, you tend to identify yourself with the 
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character portrayed and the a~tion taking place on the 
screen. So that when a child comes out of these vica·rious 
experiences, he frequently has changed behavior patterns 
and new attitudes towards social problems ( R. 529) . This 
has been forcefully demonstrated with such motion pictures 
as "Pinky" or "No Way Out" or "Gentlemen's Agreement." 
Unknowingly, after seeing pictures of this type, thousands 
of persons have rededicated themselves to the American 
way of life, because they have identified themselves with 
an experience of a very simple order in a motion picture 
(R. 530). 
Mr. Haight was not paid for coming to to Salt Lake 
City to testify (R. 520). He came because i/t seemed shock-
ing to him that it should be questioned whether the motion 
picture should be entitled to the same recognition and pro-
tection as a medium of communication and expression, as 
newspapers and books (R. · 520; 539-540). 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Before proceeding with the main points of defendants' 
argument, several preliminary observations should be made 
with respect to certain of the plaintiffs' contentions. At 
several points in their brief, the .Plaintiffs refer to what 
they consider to be inconsistencies in the trial court's rul-
ings, particularly in comparing the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury with its rulings on the declaratory judg-
ment. In the light of the procedural history of the case, 
the action of the trial judge not only was understandably 
proper but probably exceedingly wise. As heretofore pointed 
out, when this case was in the federal courts, the Tenth · 
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Circuit finally handed down a three to two decision in favor 
of the plaintiffs at the conclusion of its third hearing. Al-
though the defendants were convinced that the views 
expressed in the majority opinion of the Tenth Cir-
cuit were incorrect, nevertheless ~hese views constituted 
the only judicial expression that existed with respect to the 
construction of the Utah statute at the time of the trial in 
the state court. Since the opinion of the Tenth Circuit was 
concerned solely with the problem of construction of a state 
statute, it in no sense was controlling so far as the state 
courts of Utah were concerned. In the words of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, such decisions by federal courts involving 
the construction of state statutes in the light of constitu-
tional considerations constitute nothing more than "prelim-
inary guesses." Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 
U. S. 101, 65 S. Ct. 152; Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643; American Fed-
eration of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 761. 
Still, in the absence of any other authority, it naturally has 
some persuasive effect. And so in instructing the jury 
during the trial in the state court, the trial judge under-
standably adopted the views set forth in the Tenth Circuit's 
majority opinion with respect to the construction of the 
Utah statute, and submitted the issues in accordance with the 
theories therein outlined. In so doing, the trial court ob-
viously chose to follow the most conservative course open 
to it. In fact, the parties somewhat anticipated this action 
by trying the case in the state court largely on the basis 
of the theories and assumptions previouslY: announced by 
the majority of the Tenth Circuit. 
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In their motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion 
of all the evidence (R. 5.:12-543) and in their requests for 
a declaratory judgment (R. 94-109), however, the defen-
dants reiterated the arguments 'vhich the majority of the 
Tenth Circuit had rejected. By the time the case had 
reached the state court, these arguments had been greatly 
reinforced by the decision in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 
495, 72 S. Ct. 777, decided subsequent to the opinion of the 
Tenth Circuit. The Burstyn case held for the first time 
that motion pictures, as such, were entitled to the consti-
tutional protection of free speech and the press. But it 
was not until after the jury's "no cause of action" verdict 
and the declaratory judgment aspect of the case had been 
reached, that the trial court finally decided to adopt the 
defendants' contentions with respect to this phase of the 
law as it affected the construction of the Utah statute (R. 
179). The conclusions of the trial court were arrived at only 
after full argument and mature consideration of the whole 
case in the light of the evidence and of the Supreme Court's 
recent pronouncement in Burstyn v. Wilson, supra. 
It is true that the rulings of the trial court on the 
declaratory judgment are inconsistent with the legal theor-
ies and instructions on the basis of which the case was 
submitted to the jury. If the trial judge had adopted the 
views expressed in i~s declaratory judgment- earlier in the 
case, it undoubtedly would have granted the defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict. Also, the trial court prop-
erly might have excluded as immaterial the abundant evi-
dence introduced by the defendants as to the educational 
and informative value of the film. Out of an excess of 
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caution, however, the trial court resolved all doubts in favor 
of the plaintiffs and submitted the issues to the jury in ac-
cordance with the plaintiffs' theories of the law as contained 
in the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit. As far as the 
damage phase of the lawsuit is concerned, the jury's verdict 
ends the matter. Under no conceivable circumstances could 
the plaintiffs hope for more than the trial court allowed 
them, that is, a submission of the issues to a jury in ac-
cordance with the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit. 
The problem of construction of the Utah statute lingers 
on this appeal primarily because of the rulings of the trial 
court on the declaratory judgment. 
At no time in this case hav.e the plaintiffs raised any 
question as to the propriety of the defendants' counter-
claims ~eeking a declaratory judgment. The Court may 
be interested to know, however, that ample authority for 
the requests for declaratorY. relief is found in Gray v. Defa, 
103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A. L. R. 495, annotated 
at 507-509, and Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. '359, 63 S. 
Ct. 1115. In this important case, the plaintiffs and the 
defendants both are anxious to secure a definitive ruling 
from this Court with respect to the proper construction of 
the Utah law. 
J ' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I "7 
THE UTAH STATUTE MUST BE CONSTRUED 
TO AVOID AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RE-
SULT. 
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POINT II 
THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST 
USES "FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES OR 
FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE" DOES NOT AP-
PLY TO THE EXHIBITION OF MOTION PIC-
TURES. 
POINT III 
THE ERRATIC AND DECADENT FORMULA 
DEVISED BY THE NEW YORK COURTS IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH STATUTE IS A CODIFICATION . 
OF A LIMITED RIGHT OF PRIVACY-PER-
SONAL IN NATURE. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE 
REQUIRES PLAINTIFFS' SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHTS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW 
OF CALIFORNIA. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATUTE MUST BE CONST;RUEP 
TO AVOID AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RE-
SULT. 
In their amended complaint (R. 47-51), on the basis 
of which the trial proceeded in the atate court, the plaintiffs 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
asked that all future exhibitions by the defendants of the 
motion picture "Look for the Silver Lining" be enjoined, 
also for general and exemplary damages for all past ex-
hibitions, because of the fact that their written consent had 
not been first obtained to use the name of Jack Donahue in 
the film. This extraordinary claim to the power of life 
or death over the exhibition of a motion picture film is al-
legedly derived from the provisions of Sections 103-4-8 and 
103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943). According to plain-
tiffs, the statute confers upon them absolute and unre-
strained authority to prohibit, in any theatre where an 
admission is charged, the exhibition of any motion picture 
which uses the name, portrait or picture of their deceased 
ancestor, without their _prior written permission. 
Throughout the proceedings in this case, the defen-
, dants consistently have maintained that any such interpre-
tation of the state statute would constitute a prior restraint 
on the freedom of expression expressly guaranteed by the 
state and federal constitutions, and necessarily would render 
the statute invalid. 
At the time this argument was presented to the United 
States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, and the opinion of 
that Court was announced, there existed no definitive hold-
ing that motion pictures were entitled to the constitutional 
protection of free speech and press. In fact, except for 
dictum in United. States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U. S. 131, 166, 68 S. Ct. 915, 933, the existing au-
thorities were to the contrary. Mutual Film Corp. v. In· 
dustrial Comm. of Ohio,, 236 U. S. 230, 35 S. Ct. 387, and 
Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. (2d) 665. 
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Notwithstanding these precedents, however, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in part at least did accept the defendants' contention. 
The majority held that the state statute would constitute 
an objectionable restraint upon the freedom of speech and 
the press to the extent that it forbade the publication or 
exhibition of a motion picture which was essentially edu-
cational or informative or purely biographical in nature 
(194 F. (2d) 13). But on the basis of the particular alle-
gations in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that it could not say as a matter of Ia w 
whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was sufficiently ed-
ucational or informative_or biographical to come within the 
constitutional protection as thus defined. According to the 
Tenth Circuit's definition, only publications of an essen-
tially educational or informative or purely biographical 
character came within the aegis of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The decision of the Tenth Circuit indicated that the 
issue of whether a particular motion picture was ed uca-
tional or informative or biographical had to be determined 
in each case as an issue of fact. So, at the trial in the sta:te 
court, the trial judge submitted that issue to the jury, even 
though the evidence introduced by the defendants as to the 
educational and informative value of the film was unc9ntra-
dicted (R. 368-541). In its Instruction No. 3, the trial 
court told the jury it must find that the motion picture "is 
essentially educational or informative in character" before 
it could conclude that the film came within the constitu-
tional exemption (R. 156; 548). Plaintiffs' only exception 
to this instruction was based upon lack of evidence to 
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justify it, not that it improperly stated the law (R. 560). 
In view of the verdict, it must be presumed that the jury 
found as a fact that "Look for the Silver Lining" was es-
sentially educational and informative. So far as the plain-
tiffs' complaint for damages is concerned, this finding is 
dispositive of the case. 
The problem continues here by virtue of the defendants' 
counterclaims for a declaratory judgment with respect to 
their future right. to exhibit and re-exhibit in Utah "Look 
for the Silver Lining" also other and similar type motion 
pictures containing both factual and fictional portrayals 
of deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue, without 
the prior consent of the heirs (R. 95, 101, 106). In this 
connection, . the defendants make the contention that the 
portrayal of a prominent deceased public figure such as 
Jack Donahue is protected by the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and press, without the necessity of an eval-
uation by a jury of the specific educational or informative 
or biographical character of each film. In other words, 
the defendants' position is that the constitutional protec-
tion is substantially broader than that recognized by the 
Tenth Circuit for only essentially educational or informa-
tive or purely biographical publications. 
Perhaps some excuse for the Tenth Circuit's narrow 
definition of the scope of free· expression may have existed 
at the time of its majority opinion, but all doubts were 
swept aside by. the United States Supreme Court when it 
reversed the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in 
_Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, and in the 
same opinion discarded the vestigial remnants of Mutual 
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Film Corporation v. Industrial Commiss'ion of Ohio, supra. 
In the Bu1·styn decision, the Supreme Court said : 
"* * * [T] he present case is the first to 
present squarely to us the question whether motion 
picture~ are within the ambit of protection which 
the First Amendment through the Fourteenth, se-
cures to any form of speech or the press. 
"It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are 
a significant medium for the communication of ideas. 
They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a 
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a 
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of 
thought which characterizes all artistic expression. 
The importance of motion pictures as an organ of 
public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they 
are designed to entertain as well as to inform. As 
was said in Winters v. People of State of New York,. 
333 U. S. 507, 510, 68 S .. Ct. 665, 667. 
'The line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of 
that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is 
familiar with instances of propaganda through 
fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches 
another's doctrine.' 
"It is urged that motion pictures do not fall 
within the First Amendment's aegis because their 
production, distribution, and exhibition is a large 
scale business conducted for private profit. We can-
not agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines 
are published and sold for profit does not prevent 
them from being a form of expression, whose liberty 
is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail 
to see why operation for profit should have any 
different effect in the case of motion pictures. 
"It is further urged that motion pictures pos-
sess a greater capacity for evil, particularly. among 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
the youth ·of a community, than other modes of ex-
pression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis, 
it does not follow that motion pictures should be 
disqualified from First Amendment protection. If 
there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in de-
termining the permissible scope of community con-
trol, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled 
censorship such as we have here. 
"For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
expression by means of motion pictures is included 
within the free speech and press guaranty of the 
First and Fourteenth ·Amendments. To the extent 
that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Cor-
poration v. Industrial Commission, supra, is out of 
harmony with the views here set forth we no longer 
adhere to it. 
* * * * * 
"The statute [of New York] involved here 
* * * requires that permission to communicate 
ideas be obtained in advance from state officials 
who judge the content of the words and pictures 
sought to be communicated. This Court recognized 
many years ago. that such a previous restraint is a 
form of infringment upon. freedom of expression 
to be especially condemned. Near v. State of Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625. 
* * *" 
The factual situation involved in the Burstyn case is 
interesting. It concerned the exhibition in the State of New 
York of the film entitled "The Miracle" produced in Italy 
by Roberto Rossellini. The story involved a demented young 
girl who was a goat-tender. One day she was approached 
by a bearded stranger whom she fancied to be St. Joseph. 
After plying her with wine, the stranger ravished her. 
Thereafter the gir I returned to her village and discovered 
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her pregnancy, which she decided was due to the "Grace 
of God." She was persecuted and shamed by the villagers. 
Finally, after many hardships and great pain her baby was 
born. The experience filled her with joy and tender light. 
The story thus portrayed was regarded by many as a 
parody of the biblical account of the immaculate conception. 
It created great controversy and a plethora of favorable 
and unfavorable comments among religious groups. Finally 
the Board of Regents of the Educational Department pro-
hibited further exhibitions of the film on the ground that 
it was "sacrilegious." The action was based upon a state 
statute which permitted the Board to ban any film consid-
ered "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, 
or of such a character that its exhibition would tend to 
corrupt morals or incite to crime * * * ." In reversing 
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme 
Court held the statute invalid, stating that it created a cen-
sorship constituting an infringement of freedom of ex-
. . . pression to be especially condemned. Gelling v. Texas, 343 
U. S. 960, 72 S. Ct. 1002, reached a similar result. There 
a local Board of Censors of the City of Marshall, Texas, 
had denied permission for the exhibition of a motion pic-
ture on the authority of an ordinance permitting such action 
when the Board was of the opinion that the picture was 
"of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests 
of the people of said -city." On the authority of Burstyn, 
the Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid as a prior 
restraint on freedom of expression. 
It is respectfully submitted that the type of censor-
ship so emphatically condemned in Burstyn and Gelling 
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is indistinguishable from that imposed by an interpretation 
of the Utah statute in the manner claimed by plaintiffs in 
this case. According to plaintiffs, the Utah statute author-
izes the absolute prohibition of all exhibitions of any motion 
picture containing a portrayal of any deceased relative, on 
the mere whim of the heirs' consent. Any exhibition with-
out such prior permission would render the exhibitor liable 
to punitive dam~ges and guilty of a criminal offense. As 
thus interpreted, the statute not only vests unlimited powers 
of censorship in a vague and nebulous group denominated 
as "heirs," but it creates an effective prior restraint against 
any portrayal through speech or the press of any deceased 
person. It is inconceivable that the Utah legislature in-
tended such a result. 
In the light of the Burstyn and the Gelling cases, it is 
impossible to accept the narrow definition of the scope of the 
constitutio~al guarantees set forth in th~ majority opinion 
of the Tenth Circ~it. Burstyn makes clear that the rule of I 
free expression protects not just educational or informative 
material, but also material deemed by many to be "sacri-
legious." It protects not only expressions of political and 
social doctrine, but also "the subtle shaping of thought 
which characterizes all artistic expression." It protects not 
only biography, but also fiction. It protects not only ma-
terial which informs, but also material which entertains 
and is conducted for profit. It protects not only high class 
literature, but also salacious publications in which the 
Supreme Court could see nothing of any possible value to 
society (Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 
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507, 68 S. Ct. 665) . It protects not only expressions of a 
high moral tone, but also material which possesses a "capa-
city for evil, particularly among the youth of a community.", 
In their brief, the plaintiffs seek to escape the force of 
· · · · the Burstyn decision by arguing that "Look for the Silver 
Lining" is interdicted by the Utah statute because it was 
exhibited for box office profits. Because of this, say the 
plaintiffs, the constitutional provisions have no application. 
The difficulty with this argument is that it was expressly 
considered and rejected by Burstyn. The Supreme Court 
. stated: 
"It is urged that motion pictures do not fall 
within the First Amendment's aegis because their 
production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-
scale ·business conducted for private profit. We 
cannot agree. That books, newspapers and maga-
zines are published and sold for profit does not pre-
vent them from being a form of expression, whose 
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We 
fail to see why operation for profit should have any 
different effect in the case of motion pictures." 
Plaintiffs also urge thai because a motion picture is 
fictionalized and used for entertainment it falls outside 
of the pertinent constitutional provisions. This argument 
likewise was considered and rejected in Burstyn, not only 
because the story o~ the "Miracle" film is itself fictional 
but also by reference to the Court's earlier decision in Win-
ters v. People of State of New York, supra. In the latter 
case, the Supreme Court considered and declared invalid a 
state statute under which a bookdealer was convicted of 
selling ma8"azines containing vulgar stories of crime, blood-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
shed and lust. The Court held that even publications of 
such a cheap and fictional nature were entitled to the con-
stitutional protection, stating: 
"The line between the informing and the enter-
taining is too elusive for the protection of that basic 
right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with in-
stances of propaganda through fiction. What is one 
man's amusement teaches another's doctrines. 
Though we can see nothing of any possible value to 
society in these magazines, they are as much en-
titled to the protection of free speech as the best of 
literature." 
One of the basic irrationalities of the plaintiffs' fact-
fiction dichotomy in its relationship to free expression is its 
false assumption that all matter which is not absolutely 
factual is of no value to the public. The inaccuracy of such ' 
an assumption is indicated in Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. 
S. 146, 157-158, 66 S. Ct. 456, 462, where the Supreme Court 
in a case concerning free press and mail classification 
stated: "What i~ good literature, what has educational 
value, what is refined public information, what is good art, 
varies with individuals as it does from one generation to an-
other. * * * From the multitude of competing offer-
ings the public will pick and choose. What seems to one to 
be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring 
values." 
It is not here urged that there are no limits to the 
constitutional protection of free speech and press. But the 
limits are well defined and narrowly limited. As stated in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572, 62 S. 
Ct. 766, 769, these limitations include "the lewd and ob-
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scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fight-
' ' ing' words - those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 
And in recent times, these limitations have been said to in-
clude communications of such serious and substantial evil 
as to endanger or threaten the overthrow of the government 
by force. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 
857. The Supreme Court also has refused to extend the 
constitutional protection to the distribution in the streets of 
purely commercial advertising handbills. Valentine v. 
Christensen, 316 U. S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920. But freedom of 
expression is the rule, not the exception. Only in exception-
al situations have the limitations been recognized. In the 
light of the First Amendment's history and of the decision 
in Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 
anyone claiming a limitation to the rule of freedom of ex-
pression has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limita-
tion asserted presents a really excep~ional case. So far as 
the unrestricted prohibition claimed for the Utah statute 
in the present case, it is far from the kind of narrow excep-
tion to freedom of expression which a state properly may 
carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests· 
of society. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes in the 
Near case: "The fact that the liberty of the press may be 
abused * * * does not make any the less necessary the 
immunity of the press from previous restraint * * *" . 
And state statutes restricting expression, even when justi-
fied by an actual danger, must be narrowly drawn and not 
broader than necessary to meet the recognized evil. Feiner 
v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 320, 71 S. Ct. 303, 306; Nie-
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motko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271-272, 71 S. Ct. 325, 
327; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 206, 307-8, 60 S. 
Ct. 900, 905. 
The ·prior restraint and unbridled censorship imposed 
by the Utah statute (if construed as plaintiffs contend) 
i~ brought to special focus when applied, as in the present 
case, to fictional publications concerning deceased public 
figures. If the statute should be construed as prohibiting 
. the fictional portrayal of' deceased public figures the prac-
I I 
tical, every day results of such a construction would be dis- Ill 
astrous· to ·the cultural and intellectual life of the people of j 1 
Utah. Necessarily the statute would have to be regarded as 
a previous and unreasonable restraint on the freedoms of I i 
speech and the press provided by tpe state and federal con-
stitutions. 
Since time immemorial, the portrayal of the famous 
dead in fictional as· well as factual form has been an es-
sential part of our culture and one of the most vital and 
important forms of free expression. It must be remembered 
that our culture is a product of the generations that have 
gone before us-of those who are now dead. Accordingly, 
thinking and writing about the dead represent a great and 
substantial part of our culture. Science, to a large extent, 
is the work of those who have preceded us. History and 
religion are essentially the story and the experiences of 
those who have lived before us. Law and philosophy are 
largely the work of men who are long dead. The greatest 
and most precious part of our literature and of our art are 
the creations of bygone generations. It is in these forms-
science, history, law, philosophy, literature, art--that our 
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culture expresses itself. Thus our culture necessarily deals 
with the works and careers of the dead-particularly the 
famous dead.* In so dealing with the famous dead and their 
works, we may deal with them factually, as in science, his-
tory, law and philosophy. However, in literature and the 
arts-. the graphic as well as the literary arts-we deal with 
the dead not only factually but also fictionally, not only in 
actuality but also in the imagination. Both factual and fie-
. . . tional publications concerning the noted figures who have 
gone before us are an essential part of our culture, and the 
unrestrained right to continue such publications is neces-
sary for the survival of that culture in the form in which 
we now know it. 
Practically all jurisdictions which have given recogni-
tion to a common law right of privacy have taken pains to 
emphasize that the right does not extend to publications 
concerning public figures. As set forth in the Restatement, 
Torts, Section 867, Comment (c), such persons necessarily 
are "subject to the privileges which publishers have to sat-
isfy the curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, 
villains and victims." Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280, 282; 
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 200, 
50 S. E. 68, 72; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 704, 211 
P. (2d) 320; The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215 
(Warren and Brandeis, the creators of the right of privacy, 
expressly recognized the public figure concept as an excep-
*In a recent issue of the Saturday Review of Literature (October 
27, 1951) there is a leading article by R. R. Spencer, M. D., entitled 
"Staying Alive," in which it is stated (p. ·42) : 
"Man is the 'knowledged ape,' the only talking animal, the 
only tool-maker, the only time-binder; that is, the only animal 
capable of binding into his own experience the experiences and 
wisdom of those who lived in times long past." 
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tion to the right). What is true of living figures within 
the public eye is even more true of the famous dead. 
If the plaintiffs' contention concerning the construc-
i i 
tion of the Utah statute should prevail, the cultural blight II i i 
\ : 
that would descend upon the State of Utah would be too grim 
to contemplate. It would mean that no plays, novels, paint-
ings and other forms of artistic expression, which contain 
any fictional reference to a famous deceased person, could 
be published in Utah without the previous written per-
mission of the deceased's heirs. The practical effect of such 
II II 
I I II 
a prohibition would be to stifle the cultural life of the com- JJI 
munity. The custom of portraying famous deceased persons I 
1 
in works of fiction and in fictional situations is at least as 
old as the ancient Greek theatre. It is found, for example, jll 
in the plays of Aeschylus and Aristophanes in which famous 
personalities, then :but recently deceased, were portrayed 
under their own names in fictional situations. A work as 
celebrated as Plato's Dialogues is essentially the portrayal 
in fictional situations of the then recently deceased famous 
personality of Socrates. Another striking example is the 
depiction, under their own names, but in fictional scenes, 
of famous deceased persons in Dante's Divine Comedy. 
Shakespeare too, followed this custom. The roster of the 
famous dead who, under their own names, perform their 
fictional roles in Shakepeare's works, begins with such 
remote figures as Julius Caesar and ends with Henry VIII, 
who, in Shakespeare's time was practically a contemporary 
figure. 
In modern times portraying deceased public figures 
fictionally is one of the most common forms of artistic ex· 
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pression in the novel, the drama, in paintings, and in motion 
pictures. It would be difficult to name a famous figure 
, ~ of ancient, medieval or modern times who has not been 
portrayed fictionally in such a work. In Appendix A at-
tached to this brief is a list of titles of a few of the motion 
pictures, plays, and novels in which the famous dead have 
been portrayed fictionally. In Appendix B are set forth 
excerpts from two distinguished works: (a) A Guide to 
the Best Histo1·ical Novels and Tales by Jonathan Nield 
(Elkin Matthews & Marrot, London 1929), and (b) A 
Guide to Historical Fiction by Ernest A. Baker, M.A., D. 
Lit. (The MacMillan Company, New York 1914). These 
extracts contain the views of Carlyle, Lord Morley, Charles 
Reade a-nd Henry Seidel Canby on the significance of the 
historical novel in which the famous dead make their fic-
tional appearances. These extracts also contain the con-
sidered views of two such distinguished students of liter-
ature as Mr. Jonathan Nield and Dr. Ernest A. Baker, 
concerning the significance and value to our ~ulture of 
publications in which famous dead people are recreated in 
fictional situations. The clarity with which their views are 
expressed and the acuteness of perception which these learn-
ed scholars have brought to this particular subject cannot 
possibly be improved upon. Probably no better exposition 
exists concerning the cultural importance of publications in 
which the famous dead are fictionally portrayed. 
Most of the works listed in Appendix A and thousands 
of others like them have been· published, produced or per-
formed in one form or another in the State of Utah. But if 
the construction of the Utah statute for which the plain-
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tiffs contend were allowed, the potential liabilities and 
damage suits created thereby would be literaily incalculable. 
How many thousands of heirs of the famous dead would be 
able to bring suit for how many millions of dollars, be-
cause someone had published, produced or exhibited in 
Utah, some fictional work dealing with a famous deceased 
person? Plainly, the situation which the plaintiffs propose 
would be an impossible one. In Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho 
and Nevada (and for that matter in the rest of the 
United States) such publications would be a desirable part 
of the community culture. But in Utah, publication of such 
works would render the publishers and exhibitors guilty of 
a criminal offense and subject to unlimited liability in puni-
tive damages. In a very literal sense, Utah would become 
as a "cultural desert." 
The consequences of the plaintiffs' proposed construc-
tion of the Utap statute are strikingly illustrated by Chief 
Judge Phillips of the Tenth Circuit by the reference in his 
dissenting opinion to the well known novel The Soul of Ann 
Rutledge, by Bernie Babcock. This boolr depicts the rom-
ance of Abraham Lin·coln and Ann Rutledge and the affect 
that the untimely death of Ann Rutledge had upon the mold-
ing of Lincoln's character. In connection with this book, 
eminent Lincoln historians are divided in their opinions con-
cerning the authenticit~ or significance of the theory pro-
pounded in this book. Some believe that the romance of 
Lincoln and Ann Rutledge occurred historically approxi-
mately as represented in the book. While others believe that 
the story of the relationship between Lincoln and Ann 
Rutledge to be purely fictional and hardly more than a myth 
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~ ~ or a "lie."* But who is to determine whether this 
~ lei fine novel is or is not "informative and educational" or that 
~ ~~" it contains "fiction and untruths" and therefore ought to 
be suppressed in the State of Utah? Certainly not the 
"heirs" of Abraham Lincoln, and certainly not the "heirs" 
of Ann Rutledge. 
As Carlyle has said (Appendix B hereof), the histori-
cal novels "have taught all men this truth * * * that 
the bygone ages of the world were actually filled by living 
men, not by * * * abstractions of men." Accordingly, 
a "work of fiction * * * gives the historical student 
a bird's-eye view where previously his sight has been ob-
structed -by details," and in the words of Henry Seidel Can-
by, "fiction and history are interchangeable." This, it is 
submitted, is the answer to plaintiffs' attack on fictional 
expressions of speech and the press, whether contained in 
The Soul of Ann Rutledge or in Look for the Silver Lining 
*Writers Who Accept the Ann Rutledge Part of the Lincoln Story 
Carl Sandburg: Abraham Lincoln The Prairie Years-Robert E. 
Sherwood: Abe Lincoln In Illinois-E. P. Conkle: Prologue to Glory 
-Nicolay & Hay: Abraham Lincoln-Nathaniel W. Stephenson: 
Lincoln-Ward H. Lamon: The Life of Abraham Lincoln-Edgar 
Lee Masters: Ann Rutledge in Spoon River Anthology-Bernie Bab-
cock: The Soul of Ann Rutledge--/ rving. Bacheller: A Man For The 
Ages-D. J. Snider: Lincoln and Ann Rutledge-H. W. Gammans: 
Spirit of Ann Rutledge-Lloyd Lewis: New Light on Lincoln's Only 
Romance (New York Times Book Review) Feb. 11, 1945-T. Morris 
Longstreth: Tad Lincoln-William H. Herndon & Jesse W. Weik: 
Herndon's Lincoln-Wilma Francis Minor: Lincoln The Lover (At-
lantic Monthly, issues Dec. 1928 to Feb. 1929). 
Writers Who Reject or Doubt the Ann Rutledge 
Part of the Lincoln Story 
Montgomery S. Lewis: Legends_ That Libel Lincoln-Emanuel 
Hertz: The Hidden Lincoln-Josiah G. Holland: The Life of Abra-
ham Lincoln-James G. Randall: Lincoln The President-Albert J. 
Beveridge: Abraham Lincoln 1809-1858-Paul M. Angle: A Shelf 
Of Lincoln Books-Roy P. Basler: The Lincoln Legend-Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, 14th Edition under "Abraham Lincoln" page 139. 
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or in any fictional work in which deceased public figures 
are portrayed. 
Moreover, under plaintiffs' contention that a deceased 
public figure may not be portrayed with any degree of fic-
tionalization, what is to be done about most of the famous 
paintings of American history? Take for example Eman-
uel Leutze's "Washington Crossing the Delaware." Con-
cerning this picture, it is stated in The History & Ideals of 
American Art, by Eugen Neuhaus, Professor of Art in the 
University of California (Stanford University Press, 1931), 
at page 141: 
"Much has been written and said regarding the 
picture on the question of its historical veracity. 
The charges that it was painted abroad and that the 
shores of the picture are not those of the Delaware 
but those of the Rhine are all petty criticisms which 
cannot discount the fact that the picture is an ex-
cellent academic composition, admirably balanced, 
possessed of much dignity, and full of a spirit of 
adventure. Its theatrical qualities are undesirable,. 
but they are found in most synthetic pictures." 
With respect to this picture, it is stated at page 144 
of volume 1 of Life in America, infra, that although it is 
"false in almost every detail [it] has become the accepted 
symbol of the event." According to plaintiffs, however, this 
most famous of all American historical paintings, being 
obviously a "fictional" work, must be suppressed, or else 
henceforth in the State of Utah the exhibition or sale of 
copies of it must be subject to the prior written consent 
of the heirs of George Washington. 
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Almost everyone is familiar with the numerous paint-
ings portraying one of the saddest moments in American 
history, Custer's Last Stand. Such pictures, it happens, 
are all "fictional." Not one of them can be said to be either 
authentic or factual. On this subject Life Magazine, in its 
issue of June 21, 1948 had the following to say: 
"Few battles before or since have inspired so 
much controversy or so much bad art. Because the 
only survivor of Custer's detachment was a wounded 
horse * * * artists have let their imaginations 
run wild. Nine samples of their work, good and 
bad, are reproduced here. Custer is variously shown 
fighting with one pistol, two pistols * * * afoot 
and on horseback * * * The latest and artiest 
painting * * * is the work of Thomas Benton 
(next page), who said he did it because he got tired 
of the saloon versions." 
Under plaintiffs' contention, however, the sale of pictures 
--- of Custer's. Last Stand is illegal in the State of Utah. 
In a review (written by the distinguished American 
critic, Bernard DeVoto) of the recently published two-
volume history of the United States, in text and pictures, 
entitled Life in America, by Marshall B._ Davidson (Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, in association with the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Boston, 1951), appearing in the Book Sec-
tion of the New York Herald Tribune of Sunday, October 
21, 1951, it is stated: 
"It is striking that a picture may be factually 
false but historically true nevertheless. Thus, a fam-
ous drawing from Champlain's 'Voyages' which 
shows the explorer shooting Iroquois on behalf of 
his Algonquin allies is absurd and erroneous in all 
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its details, but it so truly presents the situation, the 
conditions, and the implications of one of the most 
decisive events of the Seventee;nth Century that to 
see it is to understand them clearly and justly. The 
idealizations, symbolisms,_ and sentimentalities of 
popular belief become an immensely useful means of 
historial interpretation. Caleb Bingham's 'Daniel 
Boone' is a mythological picture, but it is at the very 
heart of sentiments about the frontier whose im-
portance in the westward movement could not be 
overstated. Such· pictures repeatedly express the 
emotion, the illusion, and the hope for, or the mirage 
which produced human actions and which must be 
felt if the actions are to be understood." 
Would plaintiffs seriously contend that the exhibitio1;1 
and sale of historical pictures which are "factuaily false," 
like the above pictures of Champlain and Daniel Boone, are 
illegal in the State of Utah? Would plaintiffs seriously con-
tend that the sale of the book Life in America is illegal in 
Utah because it reproduces such pictures? Would plain-
tiffs seriously contend that it is illegal to distribute in the 
State of Utah the issues of Life Magazine referred to 
above because in them are reproduced fictional representa-
tions of famous deceased persons? 
In light of the disastrous consequences of plaintiffs' 
construction of the Utah statute is it possible to argue that 
they have "ethical sanction?" That they are "defensible in 
morals?" These questions are asked because the New York 
Court of Appeals in holding the New York privacy statute 
constitutional (Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 
N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, aff. 220 U. S. 502, 31 S. Ct. 490), 
did so on the ground that the restraint thereby imposed 
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upon the use of names and portraits of living persons in the 
· · · ~ form of advertisement or trade notices had "ethical sane .. 
. ·::: tion," and that the abuse eliminated was "indefensible in 
'"' morals." The New York statute had a history. It was en-
. · ··' acted to correct an existing wrong at the suggestion of the 
highest court of the state, which was shocked by the dis-
covery that the law afforded no protection against the use 
of a person's picture to promote the sale of a brand of flour. 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 
N. E. 442. And so in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
supra, the Court referred to the history of the statute and 
explained the "ethical" and' "moral" sanctions which per-
~ ~ ~ ~ suaded it to accept as reasonable the limitation imposed, in 
the face of the constitutional objections advanced, stating: 
"The power of the legislature in the absence of 
any constitutional restriction to declare that a par-
ticular act shall constitute a crime or be actionable 
as a tort cannot be questioned where the right estab-
lished or recognized and sought to be protected is 
based upon an ethical sanction. * * * There 
was a natural and widespread feeling that such use 
of * * * [names and portraits for advertising 
purposes] in the absence of consent was indefensible 
in morals and ought to be prevented by law. Hence 
the enactment of this statute." (Italics supplied.) 
But what history is there behind that part of the Utah 
. ::: privacy statute which plaintiffs contend prevents the u'se 
of the names and pictures of the famous dead in connection 
· · · · with publications which clearly are a part of the free speech 
and the press of the country? What existing wrong was that 
. . . . part of the statute intended to correct? The defendants have 
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been unable to find any such history, nor any such wrong. 
On the contrary, that P~It of the Utah statute, if construed 
. · 'P1p~#;f"_Fs 
1n the manner that 8s:ren-6tl:Ris here advocate, not only 
would not correct any existing wrong, but would instead 
create new wrongs, and as has been shown, would hobble 
culture, shackle art and re~train creative expression. The 
following language from Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publish-
ing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999, 1001, with 
reference to the New York statute is appropriate: 
"When the statute was enacted originally in 
1903, the custom of publishing in papers the por-
traits of individuals who were distinguished in their 
activities of life was very general. If the legislature 
had intended to wipe out this custom, it could have 
said so easily in positive language. It did not so say 
in terms, and the courts have proceeded to give the 
statute full enforcement, within the meaning of its 
express provisions, considered in the light of its his-
tory." 
Similarly, if the Utah "legislature had intended to wipe 
out this custom," i.~., the custom of creating and producing 
works of the imagination in which deceased public figures 
are portrayed fictionally, "it could have said so easily in 
positive language. It did not say so in terms." It is submit-
ted, therefore, that this Court should not give the Utah stat-
ute a construction which would wipe out this essential cus· 
tom. 
Briefly to summarize: Before the enactment of the 
statute here involved, the citizens of Utah had the unques· 
tioned right: (a) To deal with deceased public figures fat· 
tually, and (b) to deal with deceased public figures fie· 
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tionall·y. It is beyond dispute that any statute which pre-
::: sumed to take away right (a) would constitute an abridge-
. · · ment of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and · 
· · · the press. So also, it is submitted, with respect to any 
statute which imposed a restraint upon right (b), that 
.: = = is, the right to deal fictionally with deceased public figures. 
As herein demonstrated, the right to deal fictionally with 
deceased public· figures is an ancient and basic part of our 
cultural heritage. Without such right, our civilization and 
... - our culture would be seriously impaired. Any interference 
with that right is, therefore, an unreasonable as well as a 
· --- previous restraint on freedom of expression. Such a restraint 
cannot be justified on the basis of any distinction between 
a factual and a fictional portrayal of a deceased public 
figure. The United States Supreme Court in the Burstyn, 
Winters and Hannegan cases has made clear that works of 
fiction and entertainment are protected by the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and the press~ just as much 
as works of a purely factual character. Consequently, under 
the ruling of these cases, it would be as unreasonable to pro-
hibit a publication dealing with a deceased public figure 
fictionally as it would be to prohibit a publication dealing 
with a deceased public figure factually. Furthermore, the · 
mere fact that a motion picture is involved cannot justify 
the restraint. Burstyn v. Wilson, supra. 
It is evident that if the plaintiffs' construction of the 
- - - Utah statute were accepted, an unreasonable and previous 
· ·· - restraint of the freedom of speech and the press would be 
effected. The question· then presents itself as to how the 
statute should be construed to avoid this result. The obvious 
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answer is to give it the common sense construction of hold-
ing it inappl~cable to motion pictures or other media of 
communication within the ambit of free speech and the 
press. By its own language, the statute applies only to uses 
"for ~dvertising purposes or for pu,rposes of trade." For 
reasons hereinafter set forth, _it clearly was not the legisla. 
tive intent to include subjects of free speech and press 
within the ban applicable to advertising or trade materials. 
As stated, the implications of the Burstyn case finally 
were adopted by the trial court in its rulings on the defend-
dants' counterclaims for declaratory relief. In paragraphs 
2 and 3 of the declaratory judgment, the trial court held 
that in view of the provisions of the state and federal con-
stitutions, Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the ·Utah Code 
Anno. (1943) were not applicable to the distribution or 
exhibition of motion picture films containing factual or 
fictional portrayals of a deceased public figure such as 
Jack Donahue (R. 119-180) . An affirmance of this ruling 
would make unnecessary the consideratio~ of any of the 
other questions raised on this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST 
USES "FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES OR 
FOR PURPOSES OF T'RADE" DOES NOT AP-
PLY TO THE EXHIBITION OF MOTION PIC-
TURES. 
Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. 
( 1943) require the prior written permission of the heirs 
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in order to use the name, portrait or picture of a deceased 
::person, only if the use is "for advertising purposes or for 
·,purposes of trade." As heretofore suggested, if the statute 
-' were held to be inapplicable to the distribution and exhibi-
' tion of motion pictures or other media of free speech and 
~: the press, the constitutional problem with respect to the 
~ statute's construction resolves itself. In addition, as here-
: in demonstrated, such a construction of the statute would 
,: be in accordance with both legislative intent and judicial 
. authority as well as the evidentiary facts of the present 
case. 
The Utah statute was enacted in 1909. Except in re-
2 spect of its treatment of deceased persons, it is substantial-
·~ ly identical to the New York statute passed in 1903 (Laws 
~~ of 1903, Chap. 132). The New York law was enacted 
:.:primarily in response to a suggestion contained in an opin-
~: ion handed down the previous year by the New York Court 
~ of Appeals in Roberson v. Roc~ester Folding Bo~ Co., 171 
~ N. Y. 538, ~4 N. E. 442. In that case, a milling company 
had appropriated without permission the photograph of the 
plaintiff, a pretty young woman, and had used it to ad-
vertise a brand of flour. The advertisement, which was 
widely distributed, consisted of a photograph of the plain-
I tiff above the caption "Flour of the Family" together with 
other representations concerning the milling_ company and 
~ its product. The Court of Appeals held that in the absence 
: of a statute, the plaintiff was without remedy and it sug-
gested appropriate legislation. In response, Sections 50 and 
51 of the New York Civil Rights Code was enacted by the 
next session of the Legislature. In Rhodes v. Sperry & 
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Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, aff. 220 U. 
S. 502, the Court of Appeals of New York traced the his-
tory of the enactment, the motives which prompted it, and 
the nature of the right granted, stating: 
"* * * Such is the character of the right 
of privacy preserved by legislation protecting per-
sons against the unauthorized use of their name or 
portraits in the form of advertisement or trade w-
tices. It is a recognition by the lawmaking power 
of the very general sentiment which prevailed 
throughout the community against permitting ad-
vertisers to promote the sale of their wares by this 
method, regardless of the wishes of the persons 
thereby affected." [Italics supplied.] 
The New York statute employs the same phraseology 
"for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade" asap-
pears in the Utah statute. The particular type of wrong 
which the New York Legislature intended to correct is evi-
dent. It intended to prohibit the use of personalized ad-
vertising material of the type involved in the Roberson 
case, without the written consent of the person involved. 
So far as the New York Legislature was concerned "for 
advertising purposes or for purposes of trade" meant using 
the picture of a pretty girl to advertise a brand of flour. 
·When the Utah Legislature passed substantially the same 
statute in 1909 and used the same terminology, it is reason-
able to assume that it intended to prohibit the same kind of 
advertising and trade materials, and to remedy the same 
type of wrong. Obviously the term "trade" was used in the 
sense that denotes barter, purchase, or sale of goods, wares 
or merchandise, and refers to the unauthorized use of an 
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; attribute of personality such as a name, picture or portrait 
-~--to promote the sale of a collateral commodity. 
' 
•,' 
In 1903 and 1909, motion pictures as they are known 
today did not exist. The first talking picture was not pro-
:: duced until 1926. "Motion Pictures and The First Amend-
_> ment" 60 Yale L. J. 696. The concept of motion pictures 
- as a media of communication did not emerge until many 
~ years later. See footnote 10 of Burstyn v. Wilson, supra. It 
-. is unlikely that either the New York or the Utah Legisla-
~ tures gave any consideration to the problem of whether 
: motion pictures constituted "advertising or trade." Un-
doubtedly the Legislatures did consider and did intend to 
exclude from the ban of the statute, subjects which at that 
~ time were traditionally recognized as part of the free 
.. speech and press of the country. Otherwise, why should the 
Legislatures have confined themselves to the narrow termin-
-- ology of "advertising purposes or for purposes of trade." 
·-- If more than the type of situation involved in the Roberson 
case had been intended, surely language of a more inclusive 
· character would have been employed. As aptly stated on 
_ page 40 of plaintiffs' brief, ·"it should clearly appear from 
~ the enactment itself that an activity was covered by clear 
and decisive words or the court should not bring it in by 
- judicial construction of doubtful words." 
The decisions of this Court in cases involving similar 
statutes in which the term "trade" appears, likewise sup-
port the view that motion picture exhibitions are not in-
cluded within the commonly accepted definition of that 
term. Paramor Theatre Co. v. Trade Commission, 95 Utah 
854, 81 P. (2d) 639; Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 
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51, 16 P. (2d) 900. In the Paramor Theatre case, the 
question presented was "whether the operation of moving 
picture theatres and exhibition of films" constitute "trade 
or commerce" within the meaning of the statute defining 
the jurisdiction of the U tab Trade Commission. After a con-
sideration of many authorities, this Court concluded that 
theatrical exhibitions, although carried on for money, 
should not be classified as "trade or commerce" in the com-
monly accepted meaning of those words. The Court ·said 
that if it. had been the intention to give the words a dif-
ferent or broader meaning, "the legi"slative enactment 
should by clear and decisive words indicate the intent so to 
do," rather than to leave the matter "to depend on a judicial 
construction of doubtful words." So too, in Beard v. Board 
of Education, sup·ra, this Court held that the exhibition of 
motion pictures and theatrical performances as part of the 
extra-curricular activity of the schools was not "trade or 
commerce" within the intent of a statute providing that 
school buildings could not be used for "commercial pur-
poses." 
The definition of "trade" contained in the Paramor 
Theatre case is in accord with the undisputed evidence ad-
duced during the trial of the case at bar. Professor Eaton, 
a distinguished drama critic and teacher of playwriting, 
testified that the creation and exhibition of a play or 
motion picture is not regarded as a matter of "trade" by 
authors, critics or anyone else familiar with the drama (R. 
485). The object of trade, according to Professor Eaton, 
is something like Campbell's soup which is produced over 
and over again (R. 489), as distinguished from the pro-
duction and exhibition of a play or a motion picture which 
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represents a unique artistic accomplishment ( R. 487) . As 
illustrative of this distinction, reference was made to the 
product known as Prince Albert Tobacco. A picture of 
Prince Albert in his whiskers and long frock coat is stamped 
on each can (R. 488). Such use of a historical character 
in promotion of the sale of a. product is clearly for pur-
. · · ·poses of trade and advertising. In contrast, the play "Vic-
toria Regina" depicted Prince Albert with the same whis-
kers and frock coat. It is certain that the creators and pro-
ducers of "Victoria Regina" did not regard themselves as 
engaging in "trade" (R. 489) . In the scrapbooks, Exhibits 
1 to 8, produced by Mrs. Donahue at the trial, there appear 
numerous advertisements of the beverage "Moxie" also of 
Bulova watches and similar products, in which the name 
and picture of Jack Donahue were used along with other 
advertising material (Exhibit 2). Although the record is 
silent as to whether Jack Donahue's permission was ob-
. . . tained in connection with these purely commercial broad-
sides, they clearly represent a use of his name and picture 
"for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade." On 
the other hand; Jack Donahue was bot:h. an author and the 
star of the musical show "Sons O'Guns" (R. 222). It is 
unlikely that he considered either his play or his perform-
ance therein as a matter of "trade." 
As stated, the legislative history, the rules of statutory 
construction and judicial precedents, as well as the evi-
dence adduced at the trial, all point to the conclusion that 
motion pictures, plays, no:vels and similar achievements of 
creative art are not "advertising or trade" within the in-
tent or meaning of those words as used in the Utah statute. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
68 
When the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Cir-
cuit, considered this case, it defined "advertising or trade" 
as including the distribution or exhibition of a motion pic-
ture "based primarily upon fiction or the imagination and 
designed primarily to entertain and amuse an audience de-
siring entertainment and willing to pay therefor" ( 194 F. 
(2d) 12). Again, as it did in connection with the issue 
of whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was essentially 
educational or informative or purely biographical, the Tenth 
Circuit said that on the basis of the allegations of the 
amended complaint it could not say as a matter of law 
whether the motion picture constituted "trade" within its 
own particular definition of that term. The effect of this rul-
ing was to leave the· issue to be determined as one of fact. 
And so, at the trial in the state court, the trial judge told 
the jury in its Instructions No. 3 and No. 6, that if the 
motion picture was "based essentially upon fiction or the 
imaginative and designed primarily to entertain and amuse 
an audience desiring entertainment, then your verdict 
should be for the plaintiffs and you should proceed to 
assess the damages * * *" (R. 156, 549; 159, 551). 
No exceptions to these instructions were taken by th~ plain-
tiffs (R. 560) . In the light of the verdict, it must be pre-
sumed that the jury found as a fact that the distribution 
and exhibition of the motion picture was not "trade" as 
thus defined. 
Only at the conclusion of the case when considering the 
defendants' counterclaims for declaratory relief, did the 
trial court hold as a matter of law in paragraph 4 of the 
declaratory judgment that the distribution and exhibition 
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~ of motion picture films did not constitute a use "for ad-
~· vertising purposes or for purposes of trade" within the in-
~ tent of the statute (R. 180) . As with the constitutional 
~ issue, if this Court should affirm paragraph 4 of the de-
~ claratory judgment, this appeal would be disposed of with-
out the necessity of considering the re~aining questions. 
POINT III 
THE ERRATIC AND DECADENT FORMUL,A 
DEVISED BY THE NEW YORK -COURTS IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE. 
Reference has been made to the New York statute, 
which apparently was the model for the Utah statute. 
Under the circumstances of the similarity of the laws of 
the two states, and because the majority opinion of the 
Tenth Circuit places some reliance upon the New York 
decisions in construing the Utah statute, a brief discussion 
of the New York cases may be of some assistance in the 
present situation. 
At the outset, it should be reiterated that-· the New 
York statute deals only with living persons and their rights . 
. The New York courts have never had to face the problem 
of a right of privacy action involving a deceased public 
figure and the relational rights of his heirs. This distinc-
tion must be kept in mind in considering the New York 
decisions and their application to the case at bar. As her-e-
tofore indicated, there are profound reasons based upon cul-
tural necessity for according preferential status to publi-
cations concerning the famous dead, as distinguished from 
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the living. Since the New York decisions deal only with 
the living, they have little persuasiveness when applied to 
situations involving the famous dead. 
The New York statute had been on the books only a 
short time before the courts of that state were faced with 
the necessity of construing it so as not to interfere with 
time-honored concepts of free speech and press as typified 
by biographies and newspaper accounts dealing with famous 
living persons. The New York courts attempted to meet the 
problem by devising a formula, which, although substantial-
ly modified and perhaps destroyed by more recent decisions, 
nevertheless persists to some extent. The formula is this: 
In the case of a publication concerning a famous living per• 
son, if it is an accurate account of a current news event or 
is purely biographical or is an absolutely true portrayal or 
is essentially educational or informative, then it is not a 
matter of "trade" within the meaning of the New York 
statute; on the other hand,· if the publication is fictionalized 
or the portrayal is not true or is largely a product of the 
imagination or is not purely biographical or is not strictly 
educational or informative, then it is a matter of "trade" 
proscribed by the statute. As is apparent, the formula was 
devised not only to take care of the defin~tion of the term 
"trade" in the statute, but also to meet possible constitu-
tional objections based on free speech and the press. Es-
sentially the same formula was adopted by the majority of 
the Tenth Circuit in interpreting the Utah statute when 
the present case was pending before it (194 F. (2d) 6). 
One of the first New York cases to apply the above 
formula was Binns v. Vitagraph, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 
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:- 1108. In that case a series of motion pictures were produced 
,~ and exhibited purporting to portray Jack Binns, a wireless 
operator, and the hero of a ship collision at sea. Binns 
.- claimed that the pictures improperly portrayed him and the 
:_. -heroic event of which he was a part, without his consent. 
~ He sought relief under the New York statute for an in-
~, junction and damages. The New York Court of Appeals, 
. after holding that the "use of the name, portrait, or picture 
~- of a living person in truthfully recounting or portraying an 
. ~ actual current event" would not be within the prohibition 
of the statute, said that in the case before it "the series of 
-- pictures were not true pictures of a current event, but 
_ mainly a product of the imagination, based, however, 
largely upon such information relating to an actual oc: 
.. 
currence as could readily be obtained.'' The Court then held 
that since the motion pictures involved were neither news 
nor biography, they were within the prohibition of the sta-
tute. Substantially, the same formula was repeated and ap-
- plied with minor variations in Humiston v. Universal Film 
- Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752; Blumenthal 
r'!' 
·~ v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. S. 800; 
and Krieger v. Popular Publications, 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. S. 
,. 
~ (2d) 480. 
In recent years, however, the New York courts have 
stretched and modified their previously announced formula 
to take from under the ban of the statute, certain publica-
tions which otherwise would have been interdicted. For 
example, in. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne and Heath, Inc., 
188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 779, aff. 272 App. Div. 
759, 69 N. Y .. s. (2d) 432, the New York Supreme Court 
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held that a book therein involved was a biography of a 
famous living person and therefore not prohibited by the 
New York statute, even though the Court recognized that 
it was in part apocryphal, without factual basis, and in some 
respects not only untrue but defamatory. In its discussion, 
the Court said : 
"The book we are considering deals almost en-
tirely with the plaintiff's musical career. Very little 
is said about his private life. Inde-ed, the author 
suggests that Dr. Koussevitzky had room for noth-
ing in his life but music and a devotion to his loyal 
wife and helpmate. Interspersed with the chrono-
logical narration of the facts are stories and com-
ments in connection with the plaintiff's musical ca-
reer, some avowedly- apocryphal, others of doubtful 
reliability. Curiously enough, although there are 
many depreciatory statements, they seem to be in-
variably followed by ameliorative observations of 
unrese-rved praise. * *- * Most people know that 
a great conductor's work with his orchestra is not 
altogether carried on in an atmosphere of sweetness 
and light. The author evidently knows that too and 
loses no opportunity to inform his readers about it. 
In his final chapter, the author gives his personal 
estimate of the plaintiff's place in musical history 
and in sentence after sentence we find that deprecia-
tion and praise vie with each other for utterance. 
"There are statements in the , book which the 
plaintiff might naturally find to be highly objec-
tionable, if he is at all sensitive about those things. 
He may be able to prove some of them to be untrue 
and even defamatory. There are however, no so· 
called revelations of any intimate details which 
would tend to outrage public tolerance. There is 
nothing repugnant to one's sense of decency or thnt 
takes the book out of the realm of the legitimate 
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dissemination of information on a subject of gen-
eral interest." 
~ 
-. Still another expression of unhappiness with the Binns' 
: formula is Malo~y v. Bo-y Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 Div. 
' 166, 98 N. Y. S. (2d) 119. In that case, the plaintiff, a 
public hero who had assisted in the rescue of injured per-
~ sons when a bomber plane crashed into the Empire State 
_, Building in 1945, brought suit under the New York statute, 
for publication without his consent of an article together 
with comic strip cartoons concerning him in a magazine 
-. entitled Boy Comics. The magazine, published some six 
, months after the actual event had occurred, contained a 
series of symbolic cartoons dramatically portraying the 
_ plaintiff and his rescue of injured persons. There were a 
number of errors and inaccuracies in the account, also ex-
aggerations and flights of fancy consistent with the char-
- acter of the publication. The plaintiff placed strong re-
-= liance upon the doctrine of Binns. The New York Supreme 
.. -
Court held that even though the account and comic strips 
were sold for profit and were neither educational nor news-
worthy, the publication was a matter of legitimate public 
or general interest concerning a public figure who had been 
.~ much in the public eye, and that such a publication was not 
;: "trade" within the intent of the New York statute. The 
Binns case was disposed of with the comment that "since 
~· its decision in 1913, it has been distinguished frequently 
and confined to its particular facts." 
The Koussevitzky and Malony cases indicate the 
crumbling condition of the formula devised by the New 
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York courts in the application of its statute to publications 
involving living public figures. A recent case comment in 
51 Michigan L. Rev. 764, concerning the opinion of the 
Tenth Circuit in the instant case, sums up the defects of 
the New York doctrine and its adoption by the majority 
of the Tenth Circuit, as follows: 
"* * * In determining what matters are 
permissible because of their informational value, the 
New York course of decision has indeed been erratic. 
At times, the courts have resorted to a distinction 
between a factual treatment of events involving the 
public figu;re, which is permissible, and a fictional 
treatment, which is not, but this distinction has not 
been the · real fulcrum of decision in this area, for 
·it is often ignored and seldom rigidly applied. Be.. 
hind, and at the source of, the confusion in the New 
York cases seems to be a shifting of judicial atti-
tude as to the scope of the statute. In what seems 
to be the better reasoned cases, the courts have pro-
ceeded beyond the finding that the defendant-pub-
lisher had a commercial motivation to a considera-
tion of the material itself, demonstrating consider-
able reluctance to apply the statute so long as some 
informational value could. be found; in other cases 
the courts tend to ignore the possible value of the 
publication itself and probe the motivation· of the 
publisher in an effort to determine whether the 
publication is 'for purpose of trade' and thus, ipso 
facto, prohibited. The majority opinion in the prin-
cipal case [i. e. the Donahue case in the Tenth Cir-
cuit] seems to illustrate the defects in this latter ap-
proach. The defendant's motives in making the film 
afford no index to its possible informational value, 
which would seem to be the real question at issue. 
Nor can the value of the film be properly assessed by 
mechanical application of the factual-fictional dis-
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tinction, as the New York experience with the dis-
tinction well proves. Indeed, the court's use of this 
distinction, as the dissent in the principal case pointed 
out, makes it questionable whether historical novels 
or most historical films may be distributed in Utah 
without liability under the statute, and demonstrates 
a marked lack of regard for the freedom of speech 
and press guaranteed by the United States consti-
tution. It is doubtful that this decision will survive 
with unimpaired vigor." 
As a practical matter, no one has suggested that the 
ormula of the Binns case should be extended to many day 
:> day fictional portrayals in the State of New York of 
amous living persons. For example, there are being pub-
.shed daily in the New York newspapers, political and 
ports cartoons, in which the pictures and names of public 
igures are used in clearly fictional situations. A few days 
efore a recent prize fight, a New York newspaper carried 
cartoon in which Rocky Marciano, the well-known prize 
ighter, was shown climbing a ladder (symbolic of success) 
1 an imaginary scene. Another newspaper carried a car-
)On in which Winston Churchill, portrayed as "Androcles" 
; shown removing a thorn from the paw of the British lion. 
•hese cartoons represent living people in situations which 
re "fictional." Yet no one has presumed to suggest that 
~e New York statute prohibits such portrayals or that 
distinction should be made between the factual and the 
ictional use of a person's name and picture as applied to 
llch situations. The limitations of the Binns formula is 
ot confined to the field of cartoons. There are produced 
rom time to time on the New York stage, plays and 
~ 
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sketches in which famous living persons are portrayed in 
fictional situations. One such example is "As Thousands 
Cheer" ( 1933), a famous musical review (music by Irving 
Berlin, book by Moss Hart) in which a number of then 
living public figures were impersonated ·under their own 
I 
names including Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Hoover, Will H. 
Hayes, John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Jr. Another example 
is the famous play "I'd Rather Be Right" ( 1938), written 
by. George s~ Kaufman and Moss Hart, lyrics by Lorenz 
Hart, and the music by Richard Rodgers. In this play, the 
then living actor, George M. Cohan, impersonated the then 
President of the .United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
under the President's own name. The cast of characters 
who were impersonated in the play included members of 
Roosevelt's cabinet and of his family, and a great many 
then living famous personalities. The play was satirical 
and its situations wholly fictional. Still another example, 
the Viking Press has published in New York, over a period 
of eleven years, a series of sequelized novels by Upton Sin-
clair. In these novels the author gives his version of this 
.critical period in world history ~Y creating a. fictional char-
acter, Lanny Budd, and placing him in imaginary situations 
carrying on imaginary conversations with many living pub· 
lie figures around whom the actual events of that period 
revolve. Again, Collier's magazine of October 22, 1951, 
was devoted in its entirety to a wholly imaginary account 
of the Third World War under the title "Preview of the 
War We Do Not Want." The account described "Russia's 
defeat and occupation 1952-1960." In this imaginary ac· 
count many famous living people were depicted or men· 
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ttioned in fictional situations, including Eisenhower, Tito 
~and Cyrus Sulzberger. 
The foregoing illustrations suggest some of the prac-
~ tical limitations to which the decadent formula of Binns, 
~as exposed in the New York cases, is necessarily sub-
. ject. As indicated,. the formula is having difficulty surviv-
::ing even under the present status of the New York author-
~ ·ities. One cannot help but wonder what its fate would be 
~in the face of a challenge based upon the principles enun-
~-ciated in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 665 
::and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777. In 
1~any event, the New York formula applies only to the Living. 
-The case now before this Court deals with the Dead. As 
=heretofore pointed out, both on the basis of ..constitutional 
~:authority and cultural custom, so far as famous deceased 
:~public figures are concerned, there is no necessity for at-
t~tempting to reconcile the dying doctrine of Binns with the 
·;:more recent pronouncements of the New York courts and 
~~of the United States Supreme Court. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH STATUTE IS A CODIFICATION 
OF A LIMITED RIGHT OF PRIVACY-PER-
SONAL IN NATURE. 
:;, The plaintiffs make the claim that Sections 103-4-8 
1; and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943) are not merely 
~:a codification of the common law right of privacy, but 
;~·something more which includes a property interest. There-
~:;fore, say the plaintiffs, the trial court erred in failing (R. 
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10) to permit them to further amend their amended com-
plaint by adding allegations pertaining to the value of Jack 
Donahue's name as a property right in the nature of a 
monetary asset (R. 67). Similar type "property" allega .. 
tions were contained in paragraph 9 of the amended com-
plaint, concerning a claim that the· exhibition of "Look for 
the Silver Lining" had prevented Mrs. Donahue from selling 
a manuscript based upon the career of Jack Donahue. But 
these allegations were stricken from the complaint by the 
lower federal court and that action was approved by the 
Tenth Circuit, on the grounds of irrelevancy and imma-
teriality. Furthermore, this ruling of the federal court was 
accepted by the plaintiffs by stipulation in the state court 
(R. 64). In any event, the plaintiffs' attempt to further 
amend their amended ·complaint, after the case was at issue 
and had .been pending in the federal and state courts for 
nearly three· years, clearly was a matter for the exercise of 
the trial court's discretion, and its ruling thereon is not 
open to review on this appeal. 
So far as points I, II, and III of defendants' brief are 
concerned, it is immaterial whether the Utah statute is 
deemed to be something more or less than the common law 
right of privacy. However, since the plaintiffs have raised 
the question and since the personal nature of the right con· 
ferred by the Utah. statute is pertinent to the conflict of 
laws argument hereinafte·r set forth, the views of the de-
fendants on this aspect of the case are herewith presented. 
As previously stated, the Utah statute undoubtedly was 
derived from the New York statute. No one has ever con· 
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~ 
_ _ tended that the New York statute confers or was intended 
-._~~to confer any right except a limited personal right based 
-.'·upon but narrower than, the common law right of privacy. 
~ ' 
_· __ As stated in Koussevitzky v. All.en, To zone & Heath, Inc., 
--~ 188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 779, 781: The New York 
· ··statute "sought to protect the sentiments, thoughts and 
-~~feelings of an individual by embodying 'a legal recognition 
··--limited in scope to be sure, but a clearly expressed recog-
-- ' 
-- nition nevertheless-of the right of a person to be let alone, 
··a right directed "against the commercial exploitation of 
· , one's personality".' " It is significant also that both the 
:. majority and minority opinions of the Tenth Circuit treat 
~:the Utah statute, like the New York statute, as merely 
~- a legislative recognition of the personal right of privacy. 
It was not until the publication in 1890 of the article 
_by Warren and Brandeis in 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 that a 
... -right of privacy was clearly formulated. The article "en-
j_oys the unique distinction of having initiated and theo-
retically outlined a new field of jurisprudence'' (12 Colum-
: · bia L. Rev. 693). The authors of the article make clear 
~that even though many of the early cases were technically 
:based upon supposed relationships of. implied contract or 
:trust, the true "principle which has been applied to protect 
~these rights is in reality not the principle of private prop-
:erty, unless that word be used in an extended and unusual 
sense." The· article further defines the right of privacy 
as a distinct and independent right and states that when 
the right is invaded "a legal remedy for such injury seems 
to involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, as a 
substantive cause of action" ( 4 Harvard L. Rev. 197). 
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Since the Warren and Brandeis article, all of the better 
reasoned authorities have recognized the right of privacy 1 
. as an independent right, personal in nature, and distinct 
from any principle of property. Recovery for an invasion 
of the right of privacy is limited to injury to the feelings 
and sensibilities of the complainant. In the language of 
Prosser on Torts, Section 107, p. 1053: "[T]he right of 
privacy has been recognized from the beginning as primar-
ily concerned with the protection of a mental interest. It 
seems obvious that it is only a phase of the larger problem 
of the protection of plaintiff's peace of mind against un-
reasonable disturbance." See also Reed v. Real Detective 
Pub. 9o., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133, 138; Metter v. Los 
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491, 
494; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91; Pound, 
"Interests of Personality", 28 Harvard L. Rev. 343, 363. 
Thre·e states, namely, New York, Utah and Virginia, 
have adopted limited right of privacy statutes. There are 
no reported decisions construing the Virginia statute. There 
are a number of decisions interpreting the New York law. 
The close similarity in wording of the two acts suggests, 
of course, that the New York statute was used as a model 
by the t,Jtah legislature. Two New York decisions, Schuyler 
v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 and Wyatt v. Hall's 
Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. S. 247, the first 
decided prior to the New York statute and the second after 
its enactment, both illustrate the· view that the right of 
privacy is purely a personal right for which damages may 
be recovered only for injury sustained to a person's feel-
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ings and sensibilities by reason of the unlawful use of a 
name, portrait or picture. 
The Schuyler case was an action brought by a nephew 
of Mrs. George L. Schuyler, deceased, on behalf of himself 
and the immediate surviving relatives of the deceased, to 
enjoin the defendants from exhibiting a statue of Mrs. 
Schuyler, a noted New York philanthropist and a grand-
daughter of Alexander Hamilton. The exhibition of the 
statue was without the consent of the plaintiff or of any 
of the deceased's surviving relatives. Although the action 
was brought a couple of years before enactment of the 
New York privacy statute, the Court of Appeals assumed 
the existence of such a right for the purposes of the case. 
The Court after weighing the facts of the case decided 
that there were no grounds for a claim of mental distress on 
the part of the plaintiff or of the other relatives of the 
deceased. In the course of its opinion, the Court discussed 
at some length the nature of the particular right asserted, 
holding it to be a purely personal one, which so far as the 
surviving relatives were concerned, existed only for the 
protection of their own personal feelings. The Court stated: 
"* * * Whatever the rights of a relative 
may b,e they are not, in such case as this, rights 
which once belonged to the deceased, and which a 
relative can enforce in her behalf and in a mere rep-
resentative capacity; as, for instance, an executor 
or administrator, in regard to the assets of a de-
ceased. It is not a question of what right of privacy 
Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The plaintiff 
does not represent that right. Whatever right of 
privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death de-
prives us all of rights, in the legal sense of that 
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term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own in-
dividual right of privacy, whatever it may have 
been, expired at the same time. The right which ' 
survived (however extensive or limited) was a right 
pertaining to the living only. It is the right of pri-
vacy of the living which it is sought to enforce here. 
That right may in some cases be itself violated by 
improperly interfering with the character or mem-
ory of a deceased relative, but it is the right of the 
living, and not that of the dead, which is recognized. 
A privilege may be given the surviving relatives of 
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the 
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to pro-
tect their feelings, and to prevent a violation of their 
own rights in the character and memory of the de-
ceased. * * *" 
Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, supra, arose on a mo-
tion for an order to permit the administratrix of the goods, 
chattels, and credits of Helen Wyatt, deceased, to revive an 
action which originally had been brought by Helen Wyatt, 
herself, against the named defendant. The original action 
had been brought under the New York right of privacy 
statute, for an injunction and damages for the unauthorized 
use of Helen Wyatt's name and picture. The question pre-
sented was whether the alleged cause of action survived 
the death of the original plaintiff. The Court (Justice Sea-
bury) said that if the alle-ged violation of the rights of 
Helen Wyatt constituted an injury to her person, then the 
action would abate. But on the other hand, if the alleged 
violation constituted an injury to some property right, then 
it would survive her death and the action could be con-
tinued in the name of the administratrix. Therefore, said 
the Court, it was necessary to determine the nature and 
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~~·character of the "right" referred to by the New York stat-
·..._ ~: ute. It thereupon held that the right created was in its 
~very nature personal; the injury inflicted by violation of the 
::: right did not affect the estate of the person injured, but 
·:. was strictly an injury to the person of the plaintiff. The 
-:,--·court cited with approval Schuyler v. Curtis, supra, and 
~ concluded that the case before it did not present the ques-
~ 
~··~ tion of the independent right of the administratrix to main-
~- tain an action based on injury to her feelings resulting from 
~-. improper interference with the name and memory of the 
; deceased. If such an action could be maintained, the Court 
j' said it would necessarily be by virtue of an independent 
right in the administratrix, and not by virtue of any right 
derived from the deceased. In the course of its opinion, the 
__ Court said: 
"The cause of action arose from the violation 
of the right of privacy. It was solely the creation of 
statute, and had no existence independent of the 
statute (citations). It is evident from the statute 
that the violation of the right thereby created was 
intended by the Legislature to be punishable as a 
crime and actionable as a tort (citation). The right 
of privacy, or, as it has sometimes been called, the 
'right to be let alone,' is in its nature personal. The 
peculiarly personal character of the cause of action 
created by the statute, negatives the idea that the 
Legislature intended that it should be enforceable by 
the personal representatives of the person in whose 
favor the cause of action existed. The injury done 
by the violation of the right does not affect the es-
tate of the person injured, but is strictly an injury 
to the person of the plaintiff. * * * 
* * * * * 
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"Nor is there room in this case for the conten-
tion that the present action should be revived in 
order to prevent the defendant from improperly in-
terfering with the character or memory of the plain-
tiff. If such an action could be maintained, it would 
necessarily be by virtue of an independent right to 
maintain it, and not by virtue of any right derived 
from the deceased. The complaint alleges a cause 
of action in the plaintiff for an injury to her person 
which did not survive her death, and the motion by 
her administratrix to revive the action must be de-
nied." 
The above cases clearly demonstrate that the New York 
courts consistently have interpreted the limited statutory , , 
right of privacy of that state as exclusive from and unre-
lated to any principle of property. See Note, 28 Harvard L. 
Rev. 689, 691. So far as the Utah statute is concerned, it 
is evident that the right conferred likewise is a limited one 
based upon injury to the feelings of the "heirs" themselves, 
separate from any right of privacy which the deceased 
relative, himself, might have had during his own lifetime. 
The "heirs' " cause of action for an alleged violation of their 
right of privacy in the name of their deceased relative is a 
purely personal right, not a property right. Their damage, 
if any, would consist of "injuries sustained" to their feel-
ings by reason of the alleged unlawful use of their rela-
tive's name in Utah. The plaintiffs in the present case ob-
viously adopt~d this view of the Utah statute at the time 
of drafting both their original and their amended complaint, 
since they alleged a cause of action based only upon "in-
juries sustained" to their feelings by reason of the portrayal 
of the deceased Jack Donahue without their consent. No 
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damage of any kind was requested by reason of any in-
vasion of a property interest. The amended complaint 
speaks only of the "vexed and annoyed and humiliated" 
sensibilities of the plaintiffs. 
There is nothing in any of the several cases cited by 
the plaintiffs which in any way reflects upon the expressed 
view as to the personal nature of the right of privacy. 
Hinish v. M~ier & Frank Comp,any, Inc., 166 Or. 482, 113 
P. (2d) 438; Pavesick v. New England Mutual Life Ins. 
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, and Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 
198, 20 So. (2d) 243, all are cases which recognize the 
right of privacy as a new and independent right and histor-
ically trace the development of the privacy concept from 
the early cases involving property and contract rights. 
Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 
67 A. 392, Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 
S. E. 55, and Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 
S. W. 1076 are examples of the reasoning of some of the 
earlier cases in which the courts persist in considering the 
problem as pegged to an extent at least on property and 
contract rights, and indicate a reluctance to recognize that 
in reality a new interest of personality is involved. The 
reasoning found in cases of this type is not. in accord with 
what is now clearly the majority view, and .overlooks en-
tirely the profound consideration given the personal nature 
of the right by such outstanding authorities as Warren, 
Brandeis and Pound. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE 
REQUIRES PLAINTIFFS' SUBSTANTIVE 
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RIGHTS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW 
OF CALIFORNIA. 
The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged a single 
tort for injury resulting from the allegedly unlawful use 
of the name of Jack Donahue by exhibition of "Look for 
the Silver Lining" in various "theatres and on numerous 
occasions throughout the State of Utah and throughout the 
United States" (R. 50). The amended complaint did not 
seek damages for each separate exhibition of the motion 
picture or for exhibitions that occurred in each separate 
state. By the terms of their pleading, the plaintiffs sought 
recovery in a single cause of action for all damages caused 
by all exhibitions in all theatres where the motion picture 
had been shown· "throughout the United States." The tort 
alleged was a multi-state one, with incidents in different 
states wherever "Look for the Silver Lining" had been 
exhibited and wherever the plaintiffs had sustained injury 
to their feelings as a result thereof. These allegations were 
supported by the plaintiffs' testimony at the trial. Mrs. 
Donahue and her daughters testified that they were resi-
dents of Los Angeles, California, and had lived there since 
1936. Until the time of trial, they had never been in Utah 
except to stay over-night enroute to their summer hon1e 
in Cape Cod (R. 214; 253-254). Plaintiffs saw the motion 
picture at a preview in Beverly Hills on March 15, 1949 
(R .. 244; 251). They saw the picture only on that one oc-
casion (R. 255) and at the suggestion of one of their at-
torneys (R. 252). They were upset, humiliated and dis-
~ tressed by the picture (R. 235; 255). So far as the hurt 
to their feelings was concerned, they had never picked out 
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any particular state in which to measure their hurt (R. 
250). They didn't think they could limit their hurt to the 
boundaries of any particular state (R. 262). The full 
amount of damages prayed for in the amended complaint 
was based upon the hurt they felt as a result of the ex-
hibition of the motion picture throughout the United States 
and the world (R. 262; 265-266). The prayer for damages 
referred to all exhibitions including the exhibition at the 
Beverly Hills Theatre which plaintiffs witnessed. It was 
upon seeing the motion picture in California that the 
plaintiffs felt the most acute shock to their feelings ( R. 
26-65). 
The first question which a court is required to consider, 
when confronted with a case sounding in tort such as the 
present one, is: What law should govern the substantive 
rights of the parties? In the case of a multi-state tort such 
as the one at bar, a choice of. applicable law must be made. 
What then is the Utah conflict of laws rule under 
these circumstances? Sartin v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 
27 Utah 447, 76 P. 219, Johnson v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 
28 Utah 46, 76 P. 1089, and Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 
267, 176 P. (2d) 118, 168 A. L. R. 177, make crystal clear 
that the Utah conflict of laws rule is that the law of the 
place of wrong governs the right of recovery for injuries 
to the person. In fact, Buhler v. Maddison, supra, goes so 
far as to say that procedural matters intimately connected 
with the substantive right of action likewise must be gov-
erned by the law of the place of wrong~ The cited Utah 
cases, as well as general tort law, hold that the place of 
wrong is the place where the injury takes effect upon the 
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person. Restatement, Conflict. of Laws, Section 377; State 
v. Devot, 66 Utah 319, 242 P. 395; see also Stoltz v. Burling-
ton Transportation Co., (C. C. A. 10), 178 F. (2d) 514, 
15 A. L. R. (2d) 759. In the Devot case, this Court stated 
that if a person in Utah fraudulently should obtain money 
from a person in California, the case should be determined 
in California "where the injury was done and the conse-
quences of the wrong inflicted." 
Under the compulsion of the Utah conflict of laws rule, 
the next query is where did the impact of injury take place 
with respect to the damages alleged by the plaintiffs in 
the present case? Obviously, any "mental and physical 
suffering" sustained by the plaintiffs took effect in the 
state in which the plaintiffs were physically located at the 
time of the alleged unlawful exhibitions of the motion pic-
ture. If the plaintiffs were physically present in California 
at all times during which the exhibitions occurred in Col-
orado or Utah or Delaware or New York, the impact of 
injury on their feelings and sensibilities took place in Cali-
fornia rather than in the respective states where the ex-
hibitions took place. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs 
at all times alleged and referred to in their amended com-
plaint were citizens and residents of California. Necessarily 
their mental and physical suffering, if any, resulting from 
the acts complained of, took effect and made impact upon 
the bodies and minds of the plaintiffs in California. It 
must follow, therefore, that California law governs the 
plaintiffs' right to recover for the tort here alleged. Under 
the substantive law of California even the plaintiffs agree 
that they cannot maintain an action of the kind here al-
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leged. ]}Jetter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 
304, 95 P. (2d) 491. 
The majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit on this 
phase of the case states that "the initial sneak preview of 
the picture in California and the appellants seeing it there 
did not as a matter of law bar recovery under the statute 
· ' of Utah. * * *" It is true that a lower federal court 
in Banks v. King Features Syndicate, (D. C., S. D., N. Y.), 
30 F. Supp. 352 has held that the law of the state where 
the seal of privacy was first broken constitutes the con-
trolling law. This is one of several possible conflict of laws 
rules suggested by an article in 60 Harvard Law Rev. 941. 
But each state is free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws 
as it may choose. Wells V. Simonds Abrasive Co., 344 U. S. 
· · · 815, 73 S. Ct. 856. And the defendants' contention through-
out this case has been that the orthodox conflict of laws 
rule of Utah should be applied, that is, that the cause of 
action should be governed by the law of the state where 
the injury occurred. This is the conventional conf~ict of 
laws rule which has been established in this state. Under 
the Utah rule that the lex loci delicti governs, it is imma-
terial where the seal of privacy was first broken or where 
or when the various exhibitions of the motion picture took 
place. In either instance, the complainants' right of action 
would be governed by the la'v of the state where they sus-
tained injury to their feelings and . sensibilities, that is, 
the state where they were physically located. Since the 
only damage that is or can be claimed by the plaintiffs in 
this case is for injury to their feelings and sensibilities, it 
is a self-demonstrating proposition th~ir injury, if any, 
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necessarily occurred at the place where they were physically 
resident. Any impact of harm, whether physical or mental, j 
must take effect upon a person at the place where the 
person is located. 
As indicated in the comment to Section 377 of the 
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, "each state has legislative 
jurisdiction to determine the legal effect of acts done or 
. events caused within its territory. If the consequences of 
an act done in one state occur in another state, each state 
in which any event in the series of acts and consequences 
occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights 
or other interests as a result thereof." Thus, in a privacy 
action, both the state in which the exhibitions take place 
and the state in which the injuries or legal consequences of 
the exhibitions take place may have legislative jurisdiction 
to impose an obligation to pay for harm caused thereby. 
But legislative jurisdiction to create an obligation is one 
thing; the problem of making a choice of law between sev-
eral states each of which has exercised its proper legisla-
tive jurisdiction to create a liability is still another. As 
stated in the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 65, 
Comment b.: 
"Under the rule stated * * * [and set 
forth above], it may and frequently does happen 
that more than one state has legislative jurisdiction 
to attach rights or other interests to a series of 
events started by a person's act. In an action 
brought to enforce an obligation imposed by reason 
of such series of events or in an action brought to 
punish the actor, the court at the forum must select 
the law of one of the several states thus having 
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legislative jurisdiction, to govern the case * * * 
The rules governing such choice are stated in Chap-
~- ter 9." 
Chapter 9 of the Restatement above referred to, begins with 
.- Section 377 which defines the place of wrong as the state 
~ where the injury takes place, and continues in Section 378 
~- with the statement that the law of the place of wrong de-
' termines whether a person has sustained a legal injury. 
With respect to a multi-state tort with incidents in 
: several states such as alleged and proved in this case, each 
~ state in which any one of these incidents occurs has legisla-
tive jurisdiction to create rights and liapilities with respect 
to these acts and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, 
each state is competent to enact such legislation without re-
gard to the incidents of the tort which occur in the other 
states involved. This does not mean, however, that each state 
should apply the substantive law of the forum without re-
gard to the rules of conflict of laws. When an action which 
cuts across state lines is filed in one of these states, a court 
sitting in that state must make a choice of applicable law 
in accordance with the established conflict of laws rule of 
the forum. 
It is true that the plaintiffs contend that their cause 
of action in this case is a statutory one, with its source and 
genesis in Section 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943) 
and that it is not based upon general law. However, the 
question whether the plaintiffs' action ·is based upon a 
statute or upon general law is immaterial to the conflict of 
laws issue. As evidenced by the numerous authorities cited 
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in the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Phillips of the 
Tenth Circuit, in considering the conflict of laws problem 
it makes no difference whether the respective rights are 
created by the common law or by statute. If no cause of 
action is created at the place of injury, no recovery can 
be had in any other state. This is so even in a situation 
where the cause- of action is -conferred by statute in the 
- place where the action is brought, but is denied by the 
common law of the state where the injury takes place. Re-
. 
statement, Conflict of Laws, Section 384. Illustrative of 
this is the case of LeForest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 19 
Am. Rep. 400, in which the plaintiff was bitten by a dog 
which had strayed into the State of New Hampshire. The 
dog was owned by the defendant, a resident of Massachus-
etts. Under the common law of New Hampshire, plaintiff 
would not be entitled to recover; under a Massachusetts 
statute recovery would be permitted. The plaintiff brought 
an action in l\iassachusetts seeking recovery under the pro-
visions of the Massachusetts law. It was held that since 
the injury occurred in New Hampshire, the law of that 
state governed and accordingly the action could not be 
maintained. See also Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 2 Cir., 
110 F. (2d) 970. 
The brief of the plaintiffs on this point concedes that 
the Utah conflict of laws rule, as well as other authorities 
on the subject, provides that in a tort case the choice of 
law is determined by the "place of wrong." Section 377 
of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, defines the "place of 
wrong" as the state where the last event necessary to make 
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place. In the usual 
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situation, therefore, the last event necessary to make a tort 
complete is the fact of injury to body or mind. Such is the 
situation in the present case, where the plaintiffs' cause of 
action is based upon an injury to their feelings and sensi-
bilities. The amended complaint states that by reason of 
the violation of plaintiffs' alleged rights they have been 
"greatly vexed and annoyed and humiliated, and caused 
great mental and physical suffering to their injury and 
damage" (R. 51). No other type of damage is requested· 
or mentioned. Under the provisions of the Utah privacy 
statute nothing else could be requested or mentioned, since 
the statute specifically conditions the right of recovery to 
"any injuries sustained by reason of" the alleged violation. 
Because of the fact that the amended complaint as well 
as the language of the Utah statute specifically makes in-
jury to feelings the last event necessary to complete the 
alleged tort, there is no merit to the argument on page 98 
of plaintiffs' brief concerning the conflict of laws rule in 
defamation cases and its possible. application to right of 
privacy actions. In defamation cases, the gravaman of the 
tort is not injury to the feelings of the person defamed, ·but 
rather injury to that person's reputation so far as third 
persons are concerned. In defamation cases, the last event 
necessary to complete the tort takes place where the libel 
or slander is heard by third persons conversant with the 
reputation of the person defamed. Ordinarily, this would 
mean that the place of wrong in a defamation case is where 
the statement was published or broadcast. But it is obvious 
that an entirely different concept would be applicable to . 
a privacy case, where, as under the Utah statute, injury 
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to the person's feelings is an essential condition of the right 
of recovery. 
There is good reason and a wise policy for application 
of the conventional Utah conflict of laws rule to the type 
of factual situation set forth in the plaintiffs' amended 
complaint. The rule supplies the virtues of simplicity and 
uniformity to the solution of an otherwise complex prob-
lem. It avoids the necessity· in a multi-state tort case of 
an examination and application of the law of the many dif-
ferent states where the alleged unlawful acts complained 
of took place. In most instances, the rule that the law of 
the place of injury governs, results in the application of 
the law of the state where a plaintiff has physical status 
(usually his place of residence) and therefore confers rights 
in accordance with the policy a;nd law of· the community 
.most ·intimately connected with a plaintiff. Of the several 
conflict of law rules suggested by the authorities, it is the 
most in accord with common sense as well as legal prece-
dent. 
The problem raised here is not-as plaintiffs would 
like to pose it-whether a nonresident of Utah, who suf-
fered injury to his feelings within Utah from an invasion 
of his right of privacy in the name of his deceased ancestor 
occurring within or without Utah, can invoke the Utah 
statute. The problem is whether the State of Utah can by 
statute create a right of action for injuries suffered by a 
person in another state, on account of a wrongful act oc-
curring in the State of Utah, the force of which reaches 
beyond the territorial limits of Utah and into another state. 
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And further, if Utah can create such an extra-territorial 
right, not recognized at common law, whether the legisla-
ture intended to do so in enacting Sections 103-4-9 of the 
Utah Code Anno. (1943). In answer, it is submitted that 
if the Legislature had intended to give extra-territorial 
effect to the Utah statute, it would have so stated by clear 
and unambiguous language. It is an established principle 
of long standing that no law has any effect of its own force 
beyond the territorial limits of t_he sovereignty from which 
its authority is derived. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 
163, 16 S. Ct. 139; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th 
-Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 154, 248. Hence, the. presumption is that 
a statute is intended to be confined in its operation and 
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmakers 
have general and legitimate power. In Sandberg v. Mc-
Donald, 248 U. S. 185, 195, 39 S. Ct. 84, 86, the Supreme 
Court said: "Legislation is presumptively territorial and 
confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has 
jurisdiction." 
As herein demonstrated, under the common law con-
flict of Ia ws rule of U tab, the injury to plaintiffs' feelings, 
if any, occurred in California and California was the place 
of wrong and the rights of the plaintiff should be deter-
mined by the law of that state. Since this is the applicable 
common law conflict of laws rule of Utah, it should not be 
presumed that the legislature intended to overturn or ab-
rogate it by Section 103-4-9, Utah Code Anno. (1943), un-
less such intent clearly appears, either by express declara-
tion or by necessary implication. There is no legislative 
history of any such intent and certainly no such intent is 
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manifest from the language of the statute itself. In Niblock 
v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 582, 111 P. (2d) 800, 804, 
this Court said that where a statute imposes a liability not 
recognized at common law, it will not be extended "further 
than the clear intendment of the statute." And Carlo v. 
Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 3 N. J. 253, 69A (2d) 734, 
7 40, makes clear that "to affectuate any change in the 
common law, the legislative intent to do so must be clearly 
and plainly expressed." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein set forth, the Utah right of 
privacy statute should be construed as inapplicable to mo-
tion pictures or other publications protected by the con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech and the press; also 
such expressions of free speech and the press should be held 
not "trade" within the meaning or intent of the Utah stat-
ute; furtherrn_ore, the conflict of Ia ws rule of U tab makes 
the law of California determinative of the rights of the 
plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment entered on the jury 
verdict of "no cause of action" should be affirmed, also 
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the declaratory judgment entered at the conclusion of the 
trial should be .affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL, 
&McCARTHY, 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Warner Brothers Pictures 
Distributing Corporation and Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc. 
C. VERNON LANGLOIS, 
Attorney for Arch E. Overman and ' 
C. E. Overman. 
R. W. PERKINS, 
MORRIS EBENSTEIN, 
Of Counsel. 
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APPENDIX A 
Some of the Motion Pictures in Which Famous Dead 
People Have Been Portrayed Fictionally. 
Hans Christian Anderson in Hans Christian Ander-
son, Goldwyn-RKO (1952). 
Enrico Caruso in The Great Caruso, MGM (1951). 
Toulouse Lautrec (Famous Artist) in Moulin Rouge, 
United Artists (1952). 
John Alden in Plymouth Adventure, MGM (1952). 
Richard the Lion Hearted in Ivanhoe, MGM (1952). 
Zapata (Mexican Revolutionist) in Viva Zapata, 
20th Century (1952) ~ 
Gen. Rommel in Desert Fox, 20th Century Fox . 
(1952). 
John Phillip Sousa in Stars and Stripes Forever, 
20th Century (1952). 
I Grace Moore (Famous Opera Singer) in· So This 
is Love, Warner Bros. ( 1953) . 
Colonel James Bowie (Inventor of the bowie knife) 
in the Iron Mistress, Warner Bros. (1952). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis in The 
Magnificent Yankee, MGM (1950). 
Abraham Lincoln and Ann Rutledge in Young Mr. 
Lincoln, 20th-Fox (1939) ; and Abe Lincoln in 
Illinois, RKO (1938). 
Knute Rockne in Knute Rockne-All American, 
Warner (1940). 
Paul Dreiser (Author of "On the Banks of the Wa-
. bash") in My Gal Sal, 20th-Fox (1942). 
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Enrico Caruso in The Great Caruso, MGM (1951) 0 
Queen Victoria, Benjamin Disraeli in The Mudlark, 
20th-Fox (1950) 0 
Rudolph Valentino in The Life of Rudolph Valen-
tino, Columbia (1951) o 
Bill Cody ("Buffalo Bill") in Buffalo Bill, 20th-Fox 
(1944) 0 
Edith Cavell in Nurse Edith Cavell, RKO (1939)0 
Texas Guinan in Incendiary Blonde, Paramount 
(1945) 0 
William Morton (Boston dentist who introduced the 
use of anesthesia in 1836) in The Great Mom-
ent, Paramount ( 1944) o 
Hiram Maxim (Inventor) in So Goes My Love, Uni-
versal ( 1946) o 
Lillian Russell in Lillian Russell, 20th-Fox (1940)o 
Daniel Decatur Emmett (Famed minstrel man and 
author of Dixie) in Dixie, Paramount (1942)o 
Louis Pasteur in The Story of Louis Pasteur, War-
ner (1935) o 
Emile Zola in The Life of Emile Zola, Warner 
(1940) 0 
Woodrow Wilson in Wilson, 20th-Fox (1944) o 
Thomas Edison in Edison the Man, MGM (1940); 
and Young Tom Edison, MGM (1940)o 
Theodore Roosevelt in The Rough Riders, Paramount 
(1927). 
General Custer in They Died With Their Boots On, 
Warner (1941) o 
Andrew Jackson in The Gorgeous Hussy, MGM 
(1936). 
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Pearl White, Perils of Pauline, Paramount (1947). 
Victor Herbert in The Great Victor Herbert, Para-
mount (1939). 
Florence Nightingale in Lady With the Lamp, Brit-
ish (1951). 
General Rommel in The Desert Fox, 20th-Fox 
(1951). 
Major Frank Cavanaugh in The Iron Major, RKO 
(1943). 
Charles Parnell in Parnell, MGM (1937). 
The Rothschilds in The House of Rothschild, United 
Artists (1934). 
Benjamin Disraeli in Disraeli, Warner ( 1929) ; and 
Disraeli, United Artists (1921). 
Alexander Hamilton in Alexander Hamilton, Warner 
(1931). 
Madame Curie in Madame Curie, MGM (1943). 
Jim Brady in Diamond Jim, Universal (1935). 
Walter Reed in Yellow Jack, MGM (1938). 
Crown Prince Rudolph and Baroness Mary Vetsera 
in Mayer ling, French (1937). 
Jim Corbett in Gentleman Jim, Warner (1942). 
Chauncey Olcott, Lillian Russell in My Wild Irish 
Rose, Warner (1947). 
Johann Strauss, Jr., in. The Great Waltz, MGM 
(1938). 
Julius Reuters in Dispatch from Reuters, Warner 
(1940). 
Annie Oakley, Buffalo Bill in Annie Get Your Gun, 
MGM (1950). 
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Jack London in Jack London, United Artists (1943). 
Robert and Clara Schuman in Song of Love, MGM 
(1947). 
Dempster MacMurphy (Chicago newspaper and util-
ities executive who engaged in philanthropic 
work under the name of St. Dismas) in The 
Hoodlum Saint, MGM (1945). 
Amelia Earhart in Flight for Freedom, RKO (1943). 
Mark Twain in Adventures of Mark T'wain, Warner 
(1944). 
Nora Bayes in Shine On Harvest Moon, Warner 
(1944). 
George Gershwin in Rhapsody in Blue, Warner 
(1945). 
Henry Dunant (Founder of the International Red 
Cross) in Man to Men, French (1949). 
Tony Pastor in Daughter of Rosie O'Grady, Warner 
(1950). 
The Barretts and Browning in The Barretts of Wim-
pole Street, MGM (1934). 
The Daltons in The Daltons Ride Again, Universal 
(1945); and When the Daltons Rode, Universal 
(1940). 
Rasputin in Rasputin and the Empress, MGM 
(1932) ; Rasputin, Universal (1930) ; Rasputin, 
German (1929); and Rasputin, the Black Monk, 
Foreign ( 1917). 
Sutter in Sutter's Gold, Universal (1936). 
·Napoleon and Marie Walewska in Conquest, MGM 
(1937); Napoleon, MGM (1929); and Napoleon 
and Josephine, American ( 1924) . 
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Jesse James, Frank James in Jesse James, 20th-Fox 
(1939) ; Jesse James, Frank James in Jesse 
James, Paramount ( 1927) . 
Dr. Ehrlich in Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet, Para-
mount ( 1940) . 
Alexander Hamilton in Alexander Hamilton, Warner 
(1931). 
Dr. Samuel Alexander Mudd (He aided John Wilkes 
Booth) in The Prisoner of Shark Island, 20th-
Fox (1936). 
Bernadette in The Song of Bernadette, 20th-Fox 
(1933). 
Frederick Chopin in A Song to Remember, Colum-
bia (1945). 
Calamity Jane in Texan Meets Calamity Jane, Co-
lumbia (1950). 
Cyrano de Bergerac in Cyrano de Bergerac, United 
Artists (1950). 
Joan of Arc in Joan·of Arc, RKO (1948). 
Mother Cabrini in The Life and Miracles of Blessed 
Mother Cabrini, American (1946). 
Elizabeth and Essex in Private Lives of Elizabeth 
and Essex, Warner (1939). 
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in Devotion, Warner 
(1946). 
Alexander . Graham Bell in The Story of Alexander 
Graham Bell, 20th-Fox (1939). 
Boss Tweed in Up in Central Park, Universal 
(1948). 
Dolly Madison in The Magnificent Doll, Universal 
(1946). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vi 
Columbus in Christopher Columbus, Universal 
(1949). 
Andrew Johnson in Tennessee Johnson, MGM 
(1942). 
Billy the Kid in The Kid From Texas, Universal 
(1950) ; I Shot Billy the Kid, Lippert (1951); 
The Outlaw, RKO (1947) ; and Billy the Kid, 
MGM (1941). 
John Montgomery (Aviation Pioneer) in Gallant 
Journey, Columbia (1946). 
Lou Gehrig in Pride of the Yankees, RKO (1942). 
Peter Stuyvesant, Washington Irving in Knicker-
bocker Holiday, United Artists (1944). 
Father Duffy in The Fighting 69th, Warner (1940). 
Stephen Foster in Swa~ee River, 20th-Fox ( 1939). 
Jacques Offenbach (Composer) in The Paris Waltz, 
French, ( 1950) . 
Marie Antoinette in Marie Antoinette, MGM (1938). 
In recent years Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., have pro-
duced the following series of short motion pictures, in 
which deceased public figures were portrayed fictionally 
und'er their own names : 
Theodore Roosevelt in T'eddy, the Rough Rider 
(1940). 
James Monroe, President Grover Cleveland, John 
Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay 
and Theodore Roosevelt in The Monroe Doctrine 
(1939). 
Abraham Lincoln in Lincoln in the White House 
(1939). 
I' 
II 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vii 
General "Stonewall" Jackson, Robert E. Lee in Un-
der Southern Stars (1937). 
Andrew Jackson, Mrs. Jackson, Abraham Lincoln in 
Old Hickory (1939). 
Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, Napoleon in The 
Romance of Louisiana (1938). 
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, 
John Hancock in Declaration of Independence 
(1938). . 
Thomas Jefferson in Bill-of Rights (1939). 
Francis Scott Key, Mary Key in The Song of a Na-
. tion (1936). 
Patrick Henry in Give Me Liberty (1936). 
George Washington, Haym Salomon, Nathan Hale 
in Sons of Liberty ( 1939). 
Some of the Plays ·in Which Famous Dead People 
Have Been Portrayed Fictionally. 
Oliver Wen dell Holmes and Louis Brandeis in The 
Magnificent Yankee, by Emmet Lavery (1946). 
Anna Held, Lillian Russell (actresses); Diamond 
Jim Brady (famous night-life figure of the Gay 
Nineties) ; John L. Sullivan (prizefighter), and 
Steve Brody (the man who jumped off Brook-
lyn Bridge) in Hold Your Horses, by Russel 
Crouse and Corey Ford (1933). 
Boss Tweed and Thomas N ast in Up In Central 
Park, by Herbert and Dorothy Fields. Music 
by Sigmund Romberg. (1945). 
Nellie Bly (Reporter) in Nellie Bly, by Jack Emman-
' uel. Music by Johnny Burke and James Van 
Heusen (1946). 
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Abraham Lincoln and Ann Rutledge in Spirit of Ann 
Rutledge, by H. W. Gammans and Abe Lincoln 
in Illinois, by Robert E. Sherwood .(1938); and 
in Prologue to Glory, by E. P. Conkle (1938). 
Abraham Lincoln in Abraham Lincoln, by John 
Drinkwater (1919) ; and in If Booth Had 
Missed, by Arthur Goodman (1932) ; and in 
Yours, A. Lincoln, by Paul Horgan (1942); and 
in War President, by Nat Sherman (1944); and 
in A Man of the People, by Thomas Dixon 
( 1920) ; and in The Mantle of Lincoln, by Test 
Dalton (1926). 
John Wilkes Booth in The Man Who Killed Lincoln, 
· by Elmer Harris ( 1940) . 
Annie Oakley (famous markswoman and circus per-
former) in Annie Get Your Gun, by Herbert 
and Dorothy Fields. Music by Irving Berlin 
(1946). 
Oscar Wilde, Frank Harris in 'oscar Wilde, by Leslie 
. , 
and Sewell Stokes ( 1938) . 
Walter Reed in Yell ow Jack, by Sidney Howard in 
collaboration with Paul de Kruif (1934). 
Emily Dickinson in Eastward in Eden, by Dorothy 
Gardner (1947). 
Mary Surratt (She was innocently convicted for con-
spiring in the murder of Abraham Lincoln) in 
The Story of Mary Surratt, by Russell Lewis and 
Howard Young (1947). 
Woodrow Wilson in In Time to Come, by Howard 
Koch and John Huston (1941). 
Benjamin Disraeli in Disraeli, by Louis N. Parker 
(1917). 
Benjamin Disraeli in Young Mr. Disraeli, by Els-
wyth Thane (1937). 
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Charles Dickens in The Ivy Green, by Mervyn Nelson 
(1949). 
Charles Dickens in Romantic Mr. Dickens, by H. H. 
and Marguerite Harper (1940). 
P. T. Barnum, Capt. Kidd, Henry VIII, Cleopatra, 
Salome in Houseboat on the Styx, by Kenneth 
Webb and John E. Hazzard (1928), (From the 
novel by Jerome K. Jerome) . 
Crown Prince Rudolph and Marie Vetsera in Ma-
rinka, by George Marion, Jr. and Karl Farkas. 
Music by Emmerick Kalman (1945). 
Emperor Franz Joseph of _Austria-Hungary and 
Empress Elizabeth, Crown Prince Rudolph, 
Baroness Mary Vetsera in The Masque of Kings, 
by Maxwell Anderson (1937). 
Parnell, Gladstone, Capt. William O'Shea, Katharine 
O'Shea in Parnell, by Elsie Schauffler ( 1935). 
Edvard Grieg in Song of Norway; operetta by Mil-
ton Lazarus, from a Play ·by Homer Curran 
(1944). 
Johann Strauss, Jr. in Mr. Strauss Goes to Boston, 
by Leonard L. Levenson. Mu~ic by Robert Stolz 
and Robert Sour (1945). 
Johann Strauss, Sr. and Johann Strauss, Jr. in The_ 
Great Waltz, by Moss Hart (1934). 
Queen Victoria, Benjamin Disraeli · in Victoria 
Regina, by Laurence Housman (1938). 
Gilbert and Sullivan, Queen Victoria, Oscar Wilde, 
Crown Prince Wilhelm, Whistler in Knights of 
Song, by Glendon Allvine (1938). 
Florence Nightingale in The Lady With the Lamp, 
by Reginald Berkeley ( 1931) . 
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Edgar Allan Poe in Plumes in the Dust, by Sophie 
Treadwell (1936). 
Franz Schubert in Blossom Time, adapted by Dor-
othy Donnelly from the original of Willner and 
Reichert. Music adapted by Sigmund Romberg 
from the melodies of Franz Schubert and H. 
Berte (1921). 
John Brown in Battle Hymn, by M. Blankfort and 
M. Gold (1936). 
John Brown in John Brown, by Ronald Gow (1934). 
Jefferson Davis in Jefferson Davis, by John McGee 
(1936). 
Harriet Beecher Stowe in American Landscape, by 
Elmer Rice ( 1938) . 
Daniel Webster in The Devil and Daniel Webster, 
by Stephen Vincent Benet and Douglas Moore 
(1939). 
Lord Byron in Bright Rebel, by Stanley Young 
(1938). 
The Barretts and Robert Browning in The Barretts 
of Wimpole Street, by Rudolf Besier (1931). 
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in Moor Born, by Dan 
Totheroh (1934). 
Harriet Beecher Stowe (and several members of the 
Stowe and Beecher families) in Harriet, by 
Florence Ryerson ( 1943) . 
Aaron Burr in Colonel Satan, by Booth Tarkington 
(1931). 
Elisa Bowen ("Mme. J umel"), Stephen J umel, 
Aaron Burr in Great Lady, by Earle Crooker 
and Lowell Brentano ( 1938) . 
I i 
i i 
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George Washington, Lafayette, Major Andre, Sir 
\'Villiam Howe in Valley Forge, by Maxwell 
Anderson (1934). 
Nathan Hale in Death of Capt. Nathan Hale, by D. 
Trumbull. 
George Washington in George Washington, by Percy 
Mackaye ( 1920). 
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, James Mad-
ison, Alexander Hamilton, James Monroe in The 
Patriots, by Sidney Kingsley (1943). 
Franz, Duke of Reichstadt in L' Aiglon, by Edmond 
Rostand (1934). 
Napoleon Bonaparte in St. Helena, by R. C. Sherriff 
and Jeanne de Casalis ( 1936) . 
Napoleon Bonaparte in Dynasts, by Thomas Hardy. 
Empress Josephine, in Napi, by Brian Marlow 
(1931). 
Napoleon and Josephine in Her Man of Wax, by 
Julian Thompson (1933). 
Marie Antoinette in Marie Antoinette, by Upton Sin-
clair (1939). 
Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, Emperor of Austria in 
Madame Capet, by George Middleton (1938). 
Georges Jacques Danton, Robes pierre · in Danton's 
Death, translated by G. Dunlop, from the Ger-
man of George Buchner (1938). 
Catherine the Great in Catherine Was Great, by Mae 
West (1944). 
Peter Stuyvesant, Washington Irving in Knicker-
bocker Holiday, by Maxwell Anderson (1938). 
Du Barry and Louis XIV in Du Barry Was a Lady 
(1939). 
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Johann Goethe in Frederika, by Franz Lebar 
(1937). 
Keats, Shelley, Byron and Fanny Brawne in Aged 
26, by Anne Crawfo~d Flexner (1936). 
Anne, Queen of England ("Mrs. Morley"), John 
Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, Sarah, 
Duchess of Marlborough in Anne of England, 
by Mary Cass Canfield and Ethel Borden 
(1941). 
King James II in The O'Flynn, by Brian Hooker and 
Russell Janney, from Justin H. McCarthy's 
Novel and Play (1934). 
George Sand, Chopin, Liszt, Heine in White Lilacs, 
by Sigurd Johannsen ( 1928) . 
Queen Elizabeth and Essex in Gloriana, by Ferdi-
nand Bruckner (1938). 
Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn in Anne of the Thou-
sand Days, by Maxwell Anderson (1948). 
William Shakespeare in Second Best Bed, by N. 
Richard Nash (1946). 
Benvenuto Cellini in The Firebrand of Florence, by 
Edwin Justin Mayer and Ira Gershwin. Music 
by Kurt Weil (1945). 
Benvenuto Cellini in The Firebrand, by Edwin Jus-
tin Mayer (1924). 
Queen Elizabeth, Essex, Bacon, Raleigh in Elizabeth 
the Queen, by Maxwell Anderson ( 1930). 
Mary, Queen of Scots in Mary of Scotland, by Max-
well Anderson ( 1933). 
Joan of Arc in Joan of Lorraine, by Maxwell Ander-
son (1946). 
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Cyrano de Bergerac in Cyrano de Bergerac, by Ed-
mond Rostand (1898, 1st production in U. S. 
A.) 
Francois Villon in The Vagabond King (1925). 
Christopher Columbus, Queen Isabella of Spain, 
King Ferdinand in Christopher Comes Across, 
by Hawthorne Hurst (1932). 
Richard II, Duke of Gloucester in Richard of Bor-
deaux, by Gordon Daviot (1934). 
Cesare Borgia, Macchiavelli in The Tyrant, by 
Rafael Sabatini (1930). 
King Arthur in A Connecticut Yankee. A musical 
adaptation of Mark Twain's novel. Music by 
Rodgers and Hart (1927). · 
Thomas A. Becket (Archbishop of Canterbury} in 
Murder in the Cathedral, by T. S. Eliot (1936). 
Cardinal Richelieu, Louis XIII in The Red Robe. 
From the novel by Stanley Weyman (1928). 
Some of the Novels in Which Famous Dead People 
Have Been Portrayed Fictionally. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 0 Shepherd Speak!, by 
Upton Sinclair (1949). 
Napoleon in War and Peace, by Leo Tolstoy (1869). 
Vincent Van Gogh in Lust for Life, by I. Stone 
(1934). 
Mrs. Jack Gardner and John Singer Sargent in The 
Lady and the Painter, by Countess Eleanor 
Palffy (1951). 
Emily Dickinson in Come Slowly, Eden, by L. Benet 
(1942). 
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Abraham Lincoln in The Soul of Ann Rutledge, by 
Bernie Babcock (1919). 
Theodore Roosevelt in Rich Man, Poor Man, by Mrs. 
J. A. Fairbank (1936). 
Andrew Jackson and his Rachel in The President's 
Lady, by Irving Stone ( 1951). 
William Jennings Bryan in 42nd Parallel, by John 
R. Dos Passos. 
Anna Ella Carroll (A lawyer and the brainy woman 
behind Lincoln) in Woman With a Sword, by 
H. Noble (1948). 
Queen Victoria in The Mudlark, by T. Bonnet 
(1949). 
Ulysses S. Grant in The Crisis, by Winston Church-
ill (1901). 
Goethe and his Lotte of Weimar in The Beloved Re-
turns, by Thomas Mann. 
Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett in Miss 
Barrett's Elopement, by Mrs. C. M. A. 0. Len-
anton (1930). 
Washington in The Virginians, by W. M. Thackeray. 
Thomas Carlyle in Speaking Dust, by Mrs. E. P. 
Thorton-Cook ( 1938). 
Shelley in Orphan Angel, by Mrs. E. H. Wylie 
(1926). 
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in These Were the 
Brontes, by D. H. Cornish (1940). 
Louisa May Alcott in 0 Genteel Lady!, by E. Forbes 
(1926). 
Samuel Johnson in Dr. Sam: Johnson, Detector, by 
L. De La Torre-Bueno (1946). 
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Jonathan Swift in Violent Friends, by W. Clewes 
(1945). 
Robert Burns in Immortal Lover, by J. A. Steuart 
(1929)-. 
Shakespeare in Master Skylark, by J. Bennett. 
Alexander Hamilton, Washington, Madison, Adams 
in The Conqueror, by Gertrude Atherton. 
Byron· in Glorious Apollo, by Mrs. L. M. A. Beck 
(1925). 
Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton in Divine Lady, by 
Mrs. L. M. A. Beck ( 1936). 
Keats in Special Hunger, by G. O'Neil (1931). 
Charles Lamb, Mary Lamb in So Perish the Roses, 
by S. Southwold (1940). 
Numerous novels have been written concerning most 
of the above named deceased public figures. The novels 
listed above are merely instances. Needless to say, thousands 
of similar novels have been written concerning numberless 
other deceased public figures . 
APPENDIX B 
The following extracts are from the book A Guide to 
the Best Historical Novels and Tales by Jonathan Nield 
(published by Elkin Mathews & Marrot, London, 1929). 
"These Historical Novels have taught all men 
this truth, which looks like a truism, and yet was 
as good as unknown to writers of history and others, 
till so taught: that the bygone ages of the world 
were actualy filled by living men, not by. protocols, 
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state-papers, controversies, and abstractions of 
men." 
Carlyle on the Waverley Nov~. 
"Those who know very little of the past and 
care very little for the future, will make but a sorry 
business of the present. * * * The great Duke 
of Marlborough said that he had learnt all the his-
tory he ever knew out of Shakespeare's histo:rical 
plays. I have long thought that if we persuaded 
those classes who have to fight their own little bat-
tles of Blenheim for bread every day, to make such 
a beginning of. history as is furnished by Shakes-
pear's plays and Scott's novels, we should have done 
more to imbue them with a real interst in the past 
of mankind than if we had taken them through a 
course of Hume and Smollett, or Hallam on the 
English Constitution, or even the dazzling Macau-
lay." 
Lord Morley on "The Great 
Commonplaces of Reading." 
"I take up a volume of Dr. Smollett or a volume 
of The Spectator, and say the fiction carries a 
greater amount of truth in solution than the volume 
which purports to be all true." 
.William Makepeace Thackeray. 
"Epitomes are not narratives, as skeletons are 
not human figures. Thus records of prime truths 
remain a dead letter to plain folk; the writers have 
.left, so much to the imagination, and imagination 
is so rare a gift. Here, then, the writer of fiction 
may be of use to the public-as an interpreter." 
Charles Reade, in "The Cloister and the Hearth.'' 
"What, after all, can we know about the way in 
which men felt so long ag~Cavaliers or Crusaders 
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or Romans? But the answer to that is another ques-
tion. What can we know about the way in which 
men feel now? The dust of modernity is as thick 
as the drift of the ages-the only difference is that 
it has not settled: and still 'we mortal millions live 
alone.' Every narrative is creation, because under• 
standing is itself a creative act; the strictest history 
is born dead unless it burns and breathes with imag-
ination from within; if the p~st is only because it 
was, moment by moment that becomes true of the 
present also; realism and romance are not two dif-
ferent things ; the test of any story, scientific, po-
etic, ancient, modern or futurist, is simply that it 
convinces." 
Gerald Gould in "The English Novel of To-day." 
"Sir Walter Scott is dead. Long live Sir Walter 
Scott! His great discovery that fiction and history 
are interchangeable is a basic patent, bound to re-
appear and reappear in the history of literature 
. * * * Not psychology, not realism, not the . most 
intense modernism can kill the historical romance." 
Henry Seidel Canby in "Tke Saturday 
Review of Literature." 
(New York.) 
The following extracts are from Mr. Nield's Introduc-
tion to the above book : 
* * * For many years I have been an assid-
uous reader of novels and tales in which the histori-
cal element appeared, supplementing my own read-
ing in this direction by a careful study of all that I 
could find in the way of criticism on such works 
and their writers. Only in this way could I venture 
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on a selection involving a survey of several thousand 
volumes! * * * 
I think many will be surprised to find how 
large a proportion of our best writers (English and 
American) have entered the domain of Historical 
or Semi-Historical Romance~ Scott, Peacock, Thack-
eray, Dickens, Hawthorne, George Eliot, Charlotte 
Bronte, George Meredith, Thomas Hardy, R. L. 
Stevenson, Charles Kingsley, Henry Kingsley, 
Charles Reade, George Macdonald, Anthony Trol-
lope, Mrs. Gaskell, Walter Besant, Lytton, Disraeli, 
J. H. Newman, J. A. Froude, and Walter Pater-
these are a few of the names which appear in the 
following pages; while Tolstoy, Dumas, Balzac, 
"George Sand," Victor Hugo, "De Stendhal" (Henri 
Beyle), De Vigny, Prosper Merimee, Flaubert, 
Theophile Gautier, Alphonse Daudet, "Anatole 
Yrance," Freytag, Scheffel, Hauff, Auerbach, Felix 
Dahn, Georg Ebers, Hausrath, Manzoni, Perez 
Galdos, Merezhkovsky, Topeli us, Sienkiewicz, and 
Jokai are, perhaps, the chief amongst those repre-
senting Literatures other than our own. 
"An Egyptian Princess," "Quo Vadis ?," "The 
Last Days of Pompeii," "The Gladiators," "Hy-
patia," "Harold," "Ivanhoe," "The Talisman," 
"Maid Marian," "The Forest Lovers," "Quentin 
Durward," "Romola," "The Cloister and the 
Hearth," "The Abbot," "Westward Ho !" "Kenil-
worth," "The Chaplet of Pear Is," "A Gentleman of 
France," "By Order of the Company," "The Splendid 
Spur," "John lnglesant," "Under the Red Robe," 
"The Three Musketeers," "Twenty Years After," 
"The Viscomte de Bragelonne," "Maiden and Mar-
ried Life of Mary Powell," "A Legend of Montrose," 
"John Splendid," " Old Mortality," "John Burnet of 
Barns," "The Betrothed" (1 Promessi Sposi), "Lor-
na Doone," "The Refugees," "The Old Dominion," 
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"The Courtship of Morrice Buckler," "Dorothy 
Forster," "The Raiders," "Rob Roy," "Esmond," 
"The Virginians/' "Heart of Midlothian;" "Waver-
ley," "The Master of Ballantrae," "Kidnaped," 
"Catriona," "The Chaplain of the Fleet," "The Seats 
of the Mighty," "Richard Carvel," "Ninety-three" 
(L' An '93), "War and Peace," "Revolution in Tan-
ner's Lane," "Vittoria"-what visions do these mere 
titles arouse within many of us! And, though most 
of the books given in my list cannot be described in 
the same glowing terms as the masterpieces just 
named, yet many "nests of pleasant thoughts" may 
be formed through .their companionship. * * * 
Perhaps this introduction may be most fitly con-
cluded by something in the nature of apology for 
Historical Romance itself. Not only has fault been 
found with the deficiencies of unskilled authors in 
that department, but the question has been asked by 
one or two critics of standing-What right has the 
Historical Novel to exist at all? More often than 
not, it is pointed out, the Romanticist gives us a 
mass of inaccuracies, which, while they mislead the 
ignorant (i. e., the majority), are an unpardonable 
offence to the historically-minded reader. Moreover, 
the writer of such Fiction, though he be a Thackeray 
or a Scott, cannot surmount barriers which are not 
merely hard to scale, but absolutely impassable. The 
spirit of a period is like the selfhood of a human 
being-something that cannot be handed on; try as 
we may, it is impossible for us to breathe the at-
mosphere of a bygone time, since all those thousand-
and-one details which went to the building up of 
both individual and general experience, can never be 
reproduced. We consider (say) the Eighteenth Cen-
tury from the purely Historical standpoint, and, 
while we do so, are under no delusion as to our limi-
tations; we know that a few of the leading person-
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ages and events have been brought before us in a 
more or less disjointed fashion, and are perfectly 
aware that there is room for much discrepancy be-
tween the· picture.s so presented to us (be it with 
immense skill) and the actual facts as they took 
· place in such and such a year. But, goes on the ob-
j ector, in the case of a Historical Romance we allow 
ourselves to be hoodwinked, for, under the influence 
of a pseudo-historic security, we seem to watch the 
real sequence of events in so far as these affect the 
characters in whom we are interested. How we 
seem to live in those early years of the Eighteenth 
Century, as we follow Henry Esmond from point to 
point, and yet, in truth, we are breathing not the 
atmosphere of Addison and Steele, but the atmo-
sphere created by the brilliant Nineteenth Century 
_ Novelist, partly out of his erudite conception of a 
former period, and partly out of the emotions and 
thoughts engendered by that very environment 
which was his own, and from which he could not 
' escape! * * * · 
Again, if it be true that the novelist cannot re-
produce the far past in any strict sense, it is also 
true that neither can he so reproduce the life and 
events of yesterday. That power of imaginative 
memory, which all exercise in daily experience, may 
be held in very different de·grees, but its enjoyment 
is not dependent on accuracy of representation-
for, were this so, none of us would possess it. In 
an analogous manner the writer of Romance may 
be more or less adequately equipped on the side of 
History pure and simple, but he need not wait for 
that which will never come-the power of reproduc-
ing in toto a past age. If, in reading what purports 
to be no more than a Novel, the struggle between 
Christianity and Paganism (for example), or the 
unbounded egotism of Napoleon, be brought more 
vividly . before our minds-and this may be done by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
xxi 
suggestion as well as by exact relation-then, I 
would maintain, we are to some extent educated 
historically, using the word in a large though per-
fectly legitimate sense. 
* * * The Historical Novel exists primarily 
as Fiction, and, even though in our waking moments 
we may be persuaded of the unreality of that ' 
"dream" which a Scott or a Dumas has produced 
for us, we shall still be able to place ourselves again 
and again under the spell of their delightful influ-
ence. 1\ioreover, while admitting Dumas' careless-
ness of exact detail, it would hardly be contended 
by the most sceptical that his works (still less those 
of Scott) are without any background of Historic 
suggestiveness. Scott, indeed, shows signs of hav-
ing possessed something of that "detachment" which 
is one important qualification in the Historian 
proper ; there is a fairness and prevision . in his his-
torical judgments which we look for in vain when 
reading the works of his contemporaries. * * * 
Thus, as regards History, where the textbook fails 
in arousing interest, the tale may succeed, and, once 
the spirit of inquiry has been stimulated, half the 
battle is gained. In saying this, I am far from wish-
ing to imply that the reading of romances can ever 
take the place of genuine historical study. I know 
well that such a book as Green's "Short History of 
the English People" may prove to some young stu-. 
dents more fascinating than any novel. There are, 
however, cases in which recourse may be had to a 
high-class work of fiction for the attainment of a 
truer historic sense; while, taken only as supple-
ment to more strictly Academic reading, such a 
work may prove to have its uses. If, besides being 
of help to teachers, my recommendations should lead 
in any degree to further appreciation of the great 
masters of Romance, the very large amount of lab-
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our expended over the preparation of this "Guide" 
will be amply rewarded. 
J. N. 
II 
The following extracts are from the book A Guide to 
Historical Fiction by Ernest A. Baker, M. A., D. Lit. (pub-
lished by George Routledge & Sons, Limited, London-The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1914). These extracts are 
taken from Dr. Baker's Introduction to his book. 
* * * Historical fiction is not history, but 
it is often better than history. A fine historical 
painting, a pageant, or a play, may easily teach more 
and carry a deeper impression than whole chapters 
of description and analysis. Esmond and Tom Jones 
are indispensable adjuncts to Lecky. Scott and 
Dumas will always have a larger history class than 
any two regular historians you could name. Even 
a second-rate historical novel may have ample ex-
cuse for existence. But a good one-good, that is, 
merely as a story-though chronology may be at 
fault and facts inaccurately stated, will probably 
succeed in making a period live in the imagination 
when text-books merely give us dry bones. 
So much for the educational aspect; but there 
is another. An historical study, though in the form 
of fiction, may have a positive value as a contribu-
tion to knowledge. Just as a portrait or a statue 
by a great imaginative genius lifts a veil or furn-
ishes a lens by which we gaze into the depths of 
character, and see problems and enigmas suddenly 
grow clear, so a great work of fiction-Shakes-
peare's Cleopatra, Mr. Bernard Shaw's Caesar, Mr. 
Hewlett's Mary Stuart, or certain of the biographi-
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cal studies catalogued in the following pages which 
it would be invidious to single out, based on original 
research, and depicting their characters not merely 
as statesmen or politicians, but as living people, with 
personal as well as public interests, with ordinary 
frailties and workaday inconsistencies-gives the 
historical student a bird's-eye view where previously 
his sight has been obstructed by details. * * * 
The groundwork of the genuine historical ro-
mance-melodrama masquerading as historical can 
be left out of account-is as sincere and valid re-
construction as the best efforts of the serious his-
torian, and much the same methods are employed. 
Neither can possibly be more than an approximation 
to the reality; neither can help us to anything but 
a partial realization of the past which is no more. 
This, it has been pointed out over and over again, 
is, in its fullness and vitality, utterly beyond our 
grasp. We can never put ourselves in the place of 
an early Victorian, much less of an Elizabethan or 
a man of the Stone Age. Mental associations are 
impossible to put. off. \Ve should have to cultivate 
complete amnesia and begin life again, to get more 
than a faint and rudimentary idea of what our re-
mote ancestors really thought and felt. 
It is worth while noticing that we unconsciously 
put history and fiction on ·equal terms when, for 
example, we compare Scott's Graham of Claverhouse 
with Macaulay's. * * * 
Reconstruction of bygone days-people, man-
ners, ways of life, historical events-is the main 
business of a goodly proportion among the later 
novels enumerated in the following pages. In the 
finest historical novel of the last thirty years -
Tolstoy's War and Peace-the past is portrayed as 
if it were the present. * * * 
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Mr. Sabatini is an authoritative historian of the 
Borgias ; Mr. Hutton qualified by research and sub-
stantial monographs before he wrote Sigismondo 
Pandolfo Malatesta; and Mrs. Atherton frankly 
states that she originally intended to write an or-
thodox life of Alexander Hamilton, but, fortunately, 
decided, when she came to put pen to paper, to direct 
her powers of imaginative interpretation and recon-
struction to the more genial task of placing her hero 
in the true human perspective in Tke Conqueror. 
* * * 
* * * Of historical fiction written for a 
purpose the output has been huge, though the bulk 
of it is produced under false pretences. Religious 
propaganda or apologetics probably accounts for 
the largest amount, and politics comes next. The 
mid-Victorian Sunday-school stories about the early 
Christians typify the didactic class, and Monsignor 
Benson's studies of the Reformation and the perse-
cution of Catholics are among the best of the con-
troversial. Patriotism was the inspiration of West-
ward Ho! and also, in a more deliberate and calcu-
lated way, of Mr. Standish O'Grady's Bog of Stars. 
Several of Kingsley's romances were highly polemi-
cal in character, and those of his adversary Newman 
were obviously meant to inculcate Catholic doctrine. 
Quite a number of modern examples will be found 
of the kind of romance, like The aomans of Partenay 
and Ponthus et Sidoyne, so common in the Middle 
Ages, the glorification of a family, sometimes of the 
writer's own house. 
As the index shows, the number of Americans 
writing historical fiction is portentous, especially 
for a country which has been alleged to have no 
history. Their attention is not concentrated, how-
ever, on destroying this fallacy; French, Italian, 
Greek, Russian, and Scandinavian history has been 
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ransacked for subjects by American authors, who 
have also produced many remarkable studies of the 
English Civil War time and other periods. Personal 
reminiscence plays a significant part in a great 
many American novels. * * * 
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